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ABSTRACT
By comparing two western models: The Newcastle Initiative
(TNI) from Newcastle, England and The Lowell Plan Inc. (TLPI)
from Lowell, Massachusetts, I build a model partnership
organization and examine if it is applicable to Southeastern
Kawasaki, Japan. These three cities share similarities in
terms of the history of industrialization and these
similarities would suggest the possibility of establishing a
new public-private partnership for Kawasaki. Unlike the
manufacturing industries of Newcastle and Lowell in the past,
interviews suggested that those of Kawasaki, especially small
and middle-sized local companies, have enough technology to
survive. But in the long term, Kawasaki will experience
similar socio-economic decline as the western models.
TNI is a nonprofit pro-development small efficient government
designed to revitalize the local economy by building a better
image for its city. TLPI is also a nonprofit private
corporation whose function has changed from a planning and
policy making body to marketing, promotion, and fund-raising.
These western models turn out not to fit Kawasaki perfectly,
but I recommend the development of a partnership organization
based on many of their attributes. A private corporation, the
largest land owner in Southeastern Kawasaki, should take the
lead for the private sector understanding its corporate
responsibility in the area, the City should stimulate it and
residents, and academia should contribute to their
collaboration in forming a partnership for Kawasaki.
Thesis Adviser: Dr. J. Mark Davidson Schuster
Title: Associate Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
Chapter 1. Introduction
This thesis is a comparative case study of public-private
partnerships in Newcastle upon Tyne (Newcastle), England and
Lowell, Massachusetts with application to Kawasaki, Japan.
With a complex political situation, the southeastern part of
Kawasaki consists of a fully built-out industrial area and a
mixed use area for housing, industry, and business. I am an
international student studying institutional arrangements
suitable for urban development in Kawasaki. I have become
interested in public-private partnership organizations in the
U.S and the U.K. and researched two organizations in
particular and learned lessons from them. In this thesis I
will build a model partnership organization and examine if it
is applicable to Southeastern Kawasaki. I chose The Newcastle
Initiative (TNI) from Newcastle and The Lowell Plan Inc.
(TLPI) from Lowell because I believed that these two cities
share similarities with Kawasaki in terms of their
industrialization history. These similarities would suggest
the possibility or desirability of establishing a new public-
private partnership for Kawasaki as both a solution for the
city's problems in urban redevelopment and as a tool for
improving its urban environment.
My focus is on the organization of development rather than on
specific projects or on general public-private relationships.
TNI and TLPI are legally formalized public-private
partnership organizations upon which I base this case study.
My focus does not include government initiatives, quasi-
public organizations, or joint government-private sector
activities in which both government and private organizations
work together on a specific undertaking. I do not discuss
special policy arrangements between governments and the
private sector, such as tax incentives, enterprise zones,
land acquisition assistance, tax increment financing, impact
fees, and linkage fees. Rather, I highlight organizational
structure, function, responsibility, and style of action.
Also, the process of establishment is discussed in detail.
I have some limitations in achieving the purpose of my
thesis. My attempt to transfer western-style organization to
Japan would confront cultural differences in the nature of
economy, politics, and society among three countries. I
cannot discuss all detailed differences and similarities
which would be raised when these three countries are
compared. This is because I lack experience and knowledge of
the U.K. and the U.S. sufficient enough to articulate
differences and similarities among the three countries. But I
can formulate them from what I have experienced during
current two-year study at Massachusetts Institute of
Technology in Cambridge, Massachusetts and field research in
British cities. The cities include London, Bath, and
Newcastle. There are other limitations. The major limitation
is my English proficiency. It affected the accuracy of
information obtained from interviews held with a British and
an American interviewees. The minor limitation is scarce
resource of comparative study in city planning between Japan
and western countries. Especially, organizational studies of
this kind are scarce.
From the mid 1970s through the 1980s, many cities in the U.S.
and the U.K. were experiencing a decline in governmental
resources, and their local governments began to face a
shortage of funds for urban development. However, during that
period and afterwards, resources continued to be available in
the private sector. Some segments of the private sector
actually increased in financial strength and stability and
came to understand better the potential contribution they
could make to the economic and cultural development in their
own cities. As a result, the private sector and local
governments made cooperative commitments to revitalize their
own cities. Many public-private partnerships were formed in
cities including Newcastle, England, and Lowell,
Massachusetts.
In this coming decade, due to rapid industrialization,
Kawasaki may experience negative urban impacts for the whole
community. Newcastle and Lowell have faced similar economic
circumstances, and are now trying to revitalize their local
economies through cooperative organizations. These public-
private partnerships have been managing development projects
well. In the 90s, Kawasaki will need to immunize itself
against economic and social decline by learning from places
like Newcastle and Lowell, and apply those lessons to its
urban redevelopment. In my view, the 1990s would be an
appropriate time to set up a partnership representing as many
different interests as possible and to promote desirable
changes in the urban environment.
For this thesis I make predictions for the southeastern area
of Kawasaki. In a preliminary prediction, I raise de-
industrialization as a major problem. After analyzing
interviews held in Japan, I make only minor modifications on
the de-industrialization-oriented prediction. But in the
course of cross-case analysis in this thesis, I conclude that
a real problem is the decline of the quality in human
resources.
In modern Kawasaki, a situation similar to Newcastle and
Lowell exists. The city's key manufacturing industries,
consisting of steelmaking, shipbuilding, and petro-dhemicals,
were major participants in the Japanese industrialization
during the post war period. Depending on numerous, small and
mid-sized industrial companies with disadvantageous
employment conditions, the industrialization created one of
the most unpleasant, urban environments in Southeastern
Kawasaki. This environment included polluted water and air
quality; lack of recreational space, lack of cultural
facilities, and lack of advanced educational resources; and
low quality housing. These factors caused people to label
Kawasaki as a bad-image city. Because a short-term slowdown
in kawasaki's growth was predicted two decades ago,
industries were able to avoid major damage due to small and
mid-sized companies' ability to respond to the slowdown with
technological innovation and their flexible labor able to
change occupation. More recently, Kawasaki has begun to
experience the restructure of its manufacturing industries
and the threat of deindustrialization. Some large
corporations have diversified into high-tech fields, but
others have moved production overseas. Yet industries are
facing a more serious problem, the decline of the quality in
human resources. This decline will be deteriorated by an
inter-relationship among the unpleasant urban environment,
the aging population, the increase in the number of
immigrants, and the unpopularity of the manufacturing
industries as an occupation for young people.
To attract human resources with better quality, the
restructuring industries will have to search for a solution.
The most effective solution is to improve the unpleasant
environment of Southeastern Kawasaki and the bad image of the
city, which have been causing the decline of labor quality.
But it is not a task of one company alone. The City of
Kawasaki and its residents may have different interests but
both will need a new organization to redevelop and improve
the city. A partnership between the Private and the public
sectors would be one of the best means.
In this thesis, I recommend the development of a partnership
organization for Kawasaki. I describe The Newcastle
Initiative and The Lowell Plan and compare these
organizations. My focus is on why and how those institutions
have evolved in their particular economic, political, and
social circumstances. After examining the structure,
participants' representation, and the decision-making process
in each of the organizations, I classify the similarities and
the differences between the organizations, seek out their
sources, and indicate the implications for Kawasaki. I
construct a model private-public partnership and examine to
see if it is applicable to Kawasaki. Finally, I articulate
what will make my model partnership organization happen,
formulate trends, causes, and major actors for its
establishment.
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Chapter 2. Kawasaki, today and tomorrow
I. Background---- A brief history, geological
characteristics, and public policy
In the Edo Era (1603-1868), when Japan was governed by a
feudalistic samurai society, Kawasaki flourished as the
second post town next to Tokyo (Edo) along the south side of
the Tama River, one of the largest rivers in Japan. After the
Meiji Era (1868-1911), when a centralized regime governed
the country under the Tenno system, Kawasaki City became the
site of a number of factories. Thanks to the advantage of
water transport via the river and the proximity of Tokyo and
Yokohama, the two largest cities, Southeastern Kawasaki
started to evolve as a industrial city. Since then, it has
begun to form, with Tokyo and Yokohama, the most
industrialized area in Japan. Although the area was virtually
destroyed in World War II (1941-1945), the south of the city
experienced rapid reconstruction as a center of Japanese re-
industrialization soon after the war. The northern part
experienced massive housing development, as one of Tokyo's
suburbs, and resulted in a sharp increase in population. For
the last three decades, Kawasaki has been known as one of ,the
most developed industrial cities in Japan. At present, over
fifty leading corporations have their factories in
Southeastern Kawasaki, including petro-chemicals, electronic
machinery, steel and other metal making, ship-building, and
car manufacturing.1
It is difficult to find a boundary of urban form between
Kawasaki and the two adjacent cities, Tokyo and Yokohama (Map
1 and 2), because they have been urbanized with no vacant
land between them. Throughout the whole region the major
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industrial and housing areas have spread beyond city
boundaries. With its physical similarity to the surrounding
cites, Kawasaki is socio-economically dependent on Tokyo and
Yokohama. Most residents of northern Kawasaki work in the two
cities, and the headquarters of most corporations within the
city are located in Tokyo. As a result, the Kawasaki
citizens' interests te'nd to focus more on the other two
cities; important decisions of the corporations leading the
regional economy are made in and for Tokyo. Sandwiched
between Tokyo and Yokohama, Kawasaki has been a passthrough
for people, goods and services, and money. Nevertheless, it
has had a highly productive manufacturing base.
The population of the city is more than one million: the
southeastern region is around 17% of the city total (Table
1). But most people in the region live in the central
commercial district and the northeastern residential area. In
the waterfront zone probably only twenty or thirty thousand
live, while many people work there.
Table 1. Population
----- ---------------------------------------------------
Kawasaki City Southeastern Kawasaki
Population: 1,157,005 (Year 1989) 193, 927 (Year 1989)
--------------------------------------------
Area: 14,277 ha (35,280 acre) 3,868 ha (9,558 acre)
--------------------------------------------
Distance from Tokyo: 15 km (9.3 mile)
--------------------------------------------
Source: City of Kawasaki, Industries in Kawasaki, February
1990, Appendix statistical data pp 2-5.
Kawasaki has been infamous for the substandard housing in the
southeastern part and its polluted environment since the
Japanese economy entered a rapid economic growth period in
the early 1960s. During this period, a number of workers
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migrated to the area. This was part of a general social
relationship between the farming countryside and
industrializing cities. During the 60s and 70s, the Japanese
social structure was substantially changed by the wave of
industrialization in large cities. Industrialization broke up
the conventional structure of farming regions far away from
the industrialized cities, producing a low income society as
a seasonal labor force called "work-away-from-home" workers. 2
This society consisted of farmers who had to work in
industrialized cities during off-harvest time in order to
supplement their low incomes from farming jobs. They went to
the cities alone leaving their families in the countryside
and lived temporarily in substandard housing near the
industrialized area where they were able to get jobs. The
concentration of pollution created by the massive factories
deteriorated the "work-away-from-home" society's housing
environment.
In Southeastern Kawasaki, this unpleasant environment has
changed very little while other industrial cities witnessed
some improvement in their urban environments during the
1970s. After the Japanese economy began to grow steadily at
the end of the 1970s, the "work-away-from-home" workers
decreased in number and were almost replaced by a full time
working class. However, the deteriorated environment of
Southeastern Kawasaki remained.
From the mid 1960s to the 1970s, many Japanese urban
residents began to consider it necessary to preserve the
urban environment against pollution. In some cities, the
middle class made efforts to protest on behalf of their urban
environment. Such community movements, however, declined in
the 80s, a steady growth period in the Japanese economy.
Nqthetn Kawasaki saw a great number of the middle class who
1 3
owned single family homes emerge. Most of them worked in
Tokyo or Yokohama and thus had little interest in the
southeastern urban environment though the center of Kawasaki
to either city is less than ten miles. The City of Kawasaki,
on the other hand, has become aware of its deteriorating
urban environment, especially housing issues, but
unfortunately, it has lacked expertise and resources. To
improve the financing of urban improvements, the City
recently has been orienting itself toward pro-development-
ism' for existing industry rather than protection-'ism" for
the urban environment. Perhaps, the bottom line is that the
City prefers industrial development due to its positive
impact on the City's budget rather than housing development,
which needs more public services, such as schools, police /
fire-brigade stations and utilities, and therefore costs more.
II. A long-term prediction for Kawasaki
A. Economic and social changes
What draws my attention to Kawasaki is the specificity of its
southeastern part as an industrial area whose northern part
is residential and commercial. Southeastern Kawasaki is not
only the most intensively built out industrial area with, in
my view, the most unpleasant environment in Japan, but also
is one of the areas which have recently increased their
potential for redevelopment projects. The local, regional,
central governments, and business communities have been
interested in what will happen in this area.
As shown by Map 4, its land use is clearly divided into a
residential zone and a commercial zone by an express highway
running from Tokyo to Yokohama; the Tsurumi River runs along
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its western edge. It was formed by landfill between 1920 and
1970 (MAP 3) and is primarily for industrial uses; housing
and commercial buildings are located on the northern part of
the railroad tracks. The coastal area of Kawasaki includes a
waterfront zone and an industrial island (PHOTO 1).
Separating the two is a half mile wide canal used by ships
bringing in industrial materials and leaving with finished
goods. The waterfront zone has several sub-canals connected
to the main canal and is occupied by power plants, oil and
gas storage tanks, sewage processing plants, petro-chemical
manufacturers, and steel-structure fabricators. The
industrial island is occupied by a steelmaking plant, and oil
storage tanks. I chose Kawasaki for my thesis because of the
magnitude of redevelopment pressures, the potential for
negative social changes, and the degree of unpleasantness in
the urban environment. They have motivated me to find the
best organizational arrangement to mitigate them.
My prediction is that in the long-term the manufacturing
industries of Kawasaki, which have led post war Japanese
economic growth, will experience a downturn. Just like
industrial cities in the U.S. and the U.K., Kawasaki as a
whole will experience negative impacts on its community' s
social and physical environment. The effects will be even
more severe in Kawasaki because of three problems: first,
fewer residents participate in the process of urban
development; second, scenarios for the redevelopment of the
community in Kawasaki are made by the City which is inclined
to support the interests of large, private corporations and
to neglect those of residents; and third, the private
corporations are indifferent toward public benefits. Planners
in the City focus on economic development but do not value
social equity in urban redevelopment. Residents are excluded
from the process of development in their own place. The
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hardest situation will occur in Southeastern Kawasaki because
its levels of physical environment and public services are
already low and there is no resident participation in
redevelopment projects. The people who will suffer directly
or indirectly disadvantages from the negative impacts will be
not only the residents of Southeastern Kawasaki but also the
city's whole community.
The standard of living and the level of public services of
Southeastern Kawasaki, which the economic and social changes
will affect, are already as low as that of other industrial
cities in Japan. Housing is narrow, built with cheap
materials, and lacks privacy. Though the basic
infrastructure, such as water supply and telecommunication
systems, is equipped, the environment is not suitable for
residential uses because the area's sewage and transportation
systems are not efficient. The level of pollution probably
exceeds government standards. The Tsurumi River, on the
western edge of the focus area, and the canals are so
contaminated by wastes from houses and industries in and
around the city that dysentery was detected in the river by a
public health agency some years ago. The air is also
contaminated from engineering industries. The area does not
have an advanced education system, the average education
level of the area's residents is lower than that of other
major cities, and some of them are forced to work in mid-
sized or small firms, which do not pay well. Needless to say,
they do not have enough time and money to spend on vacations.
But there are few recreational and cultural places in this
area for them. The area lacks parks, sports facilities,
libraries, museums, theaters, and concert halls. The worst
aspect is inaccessibility to the waterfront because of the
industrial buildings. There are no open spaces, greenery, or
walkways.
1 6
National highway projects will also have a negative impact on
the environment of Kawasaki and of its southeastern part in
particular. The Tokyo Bay waterfront expressway will be
completed by 1994. It was planned to connect three of the
most vigorous economic cities, Chiba, Tokyo, and Yokohama.
Around the same time, 'Haneda International Airport, only
several miles away from the island, will have been enlarged
to handle more airplanes. By 1997, Tokyo Bay Crossing Bridge
will have been constructed and will make a circular express
road connecting Chiba, Tokyo, Kawasaki, and Yokohama. These
tremendous developments in transportation systems will
certainly fuel the Japanese economy; however, they will not
improve conditions in Kawasaki. They will affect the
community and local economy because improvements in
transportation will allow more people and investments to flow
into the area from other areas and increase the potential of
inequitable redevelopment for the community.
Japan is experiencing significant social changes, including
an aging population 3, which will affect the city in the
future. Southeastern Kawasaki will have more elderly people
than other eastern cities, such as Tokyo, Yokohama, and
Chiba. A governmental committee has estimated that by 2000,
15.6% of the population will be over sixty-five years old in
Japan.4 Southeastern Kawasaki will have an even higher rate
than 15.6% since it is already over 10%, 2% higher than the
average in Japan. 5 Not only is this the result of natural
aging but the area has an old and industrial image. Since it
is not a desirable place to live, the young are leaving to
the suburban region of Northwestern Kawasaki, Yokohama, or.
Tokyo. Even if the young live in Kawasaki, they choose to
work in more attractive cities, such as Yokohama and Tokyo,
where there are higher incomes and more cultural
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opportunities. Needless to say, this trend is the.same in the
U.S. and the U.K.
Another important social change is the growing population of
foreigners. After World War II, the central government
limited the number of foreigners living in Japan by imposing
strict conditions on immigration permits. Until recently,
this policy has not been a problem since Japan was a second-
rate nation in terms of economic power, but today,
economically competitive, this policy is certainly outdated.
Since democratization has occurred worldwide, Japan's limits
on immigration do not fit the direction of democratization in
the current world. Though the percentage of foreigners is
still small and official information on the current growth
rate is not available, there has been a significant increase
in the number of foreigners in Southeastern Kawasaki and part
of Chiba where rents are cheaper than in other eastern cities
because of their worse living environments. Attracted by
Japan's strong economy and cheaper rents, many Asian people
are coming to Kawasaki and Chiba. Those who have legitimate
rights to live in Kawasaki come from South and North Korea,
China, and the U.S. Other foreigners from Southeast Asia and
the Middle East, such as the Philippines and Turkey, only
have work visas, and live in Japan illegally for long
periods. Though payments for their jobs are better than in
their countries, their working conditions are very bad simply
because they are not guaranteed the right to work. Some of
them do not seem to get jobs. Others get jobs yet they send
much of the cash earned home to their families living in
their own countries. They do not spend money on better living
conditions.
This immigration will further deteriorate the urban
environment of Kawasaki. Living conditions for illegal
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foreigners are becoming worse; poverty and crime are
increasing because of their below-minimum living stipends and
unemployment. Worse, there are conflicts between immigrants
and longtime members of the community. Fortunately, but
slowly, the government is developing new policies for
immigrant issues.
In my view, these problems will increase the possibility of a
new organizational arrangement for the whole community of
Kawasaki to build democratically sound urban development
plans and bring about a democratically sound urban
development process, though what arrangement is appropriate
is not clear to me at this point in time.
B. The possibility of a new public-private partnership
organization
In Kawasaki or even in Japan, the citizen's right for
equitable access to environmental resources is scarcely
respected. The corporations that operate factories in
Southeastern Kawasaki not willing to contribute -to social
benefits. Facing future economic and social problems, the
local government, restructuring industries, and citizens will
need a long term, new partnership for urban redevelopment in
Southeastern Kawasaki because certain needs for realizing
public benefits will converge:
1) industries will have to restructure themselves in an
attempt to improve the image of the city and to attract a
capable labor force;
2) residents will have to improve housing and living
conditions, strengthen local confidence, and recognize
diversifying ethnicity in the community; and
3) the local government will need to raise revenue to meet
the needs of social welfare especially for the elderly.
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Only a new type of development partnership will be able to
link these different interests altogether. It is a new public-
private partnership organization that has the possibility to
meet these interests. The so called "third sector", the
existing Japanese public-private partnership in urban and
regional development, would be an alternative organization,
but it is not suitable for realizing public benefits. I
discuss later the problems of third sector organizations.
I will demonstrate that only a new public-private
organization will have any chance of succeeding. If such a
public-private partnership organization in urban development
is created, it will be the best institution to promote a
democratic and efficient development process. Its focus will
be Southeastern Kawasaki. Coordinating different interests
and balancing benefits for different entities, the
partnership organization will be able to present a sound
policy for redevelopment in Southeastern Kawasaki and propose
how to implement it. It will be able to promote efficiently
the rearrangement of land use by managing the exchange and
purchase of land according to its redevelopment plan. More
important, it will mobilize citizens to participate in the
urban development process. This should be formalized
politically and legally because formalization can make it
clear who has responsibility and should have leadership.
Responsibility and leadership should be better articulated
than in the currently -fragmented Japanese politics when urban
development issues deal with different interests. This will
be discussed more in a later chapter. (A redevelopment
scenario is presented in Appendix C.)
Is my prediction concerning the long-term decline of Kawasaki
correct? Interviews are one of the best methods to test my
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long-term prediction for Kawasaki and to see whether or not a
new public-private partnership is necessary in the
redevelopment of Southeastern Kawasaki. Presented below is a
summary of the interviews that I held from January 14 to 23,
1991 in Japan. Interviewees' views are grouped accordingly
to these ten issues: general; factors of industrial
strength; concerns for redevelopment; political power of the
Central Government; more contingencies; conflict between the
Prefectural Government and the City; weak local autonomy and
underserved citizens; obstacles for the forming of a new
public-private partnership; poor record of citizenship; and
scarcity of leadership. My reaction to interview results will
be presented after this section.
III. Interviewees' view on the redevelopment of Kawasaki and
a new partnership
In January in Japan, I interviewed ten key figures involved
in the redevelopment of Southeastern Kawasaki. These
interviews focused on a set of key questions:
i) "My prediction is that the manufacturing industries
which have been leading the post war Japanese economic
growth will enter into a downturn. Just like industrial,
cities in the U.S. and the U.K., Kawasaki will experience
negative impacts on its community's social and physical
environment. Do you agree?"
ii) "The whole community will need to have a public-private
partnership organization to revitalize the city. Do you
agree?"
iii) "If you do not agree, tell me your opinion about urban
development in the future Kawasaki and problems."
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iv) "What do you think has to be done to solve these
problems?"
v) "Who should be involved? Who should lead? And what kind
of institution is necessary?"
vi) 'Do you think that partnerships on the American and the
British models are applicable to Kawasaki?"
I selected people who represented the public sector, the
private sector, and citizens. The interviewees were:
i) The Local Government:
a) Mr. Takestugu Kimishima, Executive City Planner, Section
of Intra-city Rearrangement Planning, Department of Urban
Rearrangement, City of Kawasaki
b) Mr. Ryoh Uemastu, Chief Planner, Department of Planning
Management, Office of General Administration, City of
Kawasaki
c) Mr. Nobuhide Kobayashi, Department of Building Ordinance
Administration, City of Kawasaki
ii) The Prefectural Government:
d)Mr. Akio Baba, Manager, Department of Industrial Policy,
Office of Commerce and Industry, Kanagawa Prefecture
iii) The Central Government:
e) Mr. Kimihiro Hashimoto, Office of Metropolitan
Development Management, National Land Management Agency,
Central Government
iv) Public investment agency
f) Mr. Yasuyuki Aida, Department of Urban Development,
Japan Development Bank
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v) Quasi-public agency:
g) Mr Kazuhiko Abe, Japan Development and Planning
Consultant
vi) Private organization
h) Mr.Yukichi Inoue, Department of Industrial Development,
Kawasaki Chamber of Commerce and Industry
vii) Private development company
i) Mr. Atsushi Arai, Director of Kawasaki Branch Office,
Mistui Real Estate Development Corporation
viii) Voluntary organization and individual activist
j) Mr. Takashi Ito, Representative, Tokyo's Bridge
Preservation Group
Lecturer, Department of Civil Engineering, Housei
University, Tokyo
ix) Academic
k) Shun-ichi Watanabe, Professor, Department of
Architecture, School of Engineering, Tokyo Science and
Engineering University
When deciding whom I would interview, I decided to classify
the categories of organization that they represented and
asked Mr. Hideki Azuma, an urban planner, to set up
interviewees for me. He is an urban planner working for NKK
Corporation, a steelmaking and engineering company, which is
trying to redevelop Southeastern Kawasaki through forming a
partnership group among private landowners in the area. I
requested some officials of the City's departments related
closely to policy, planning, and redevelopment for
Southeastern Kawasaki. Also, I listed: a Central Government
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agency because of its national development policy affecting
the area; a Prefectural Government department because of its
influential position between the local and the national
governments; a public financier because of its potential
impacts on decisions over the area's redevelopment issues; a
public planning firm because of its expertise in organizing
third sector institutions; the area's Chamber of Commerce &
Industry because of its expected role to coordinate private
companies' interests; a private developer because of its
power to initiate projects in the area; a voluntary
organization because of my interegt in resident action; and
academia because of its knowledge of western partnership. Mr.
Azuma identified the eleven individuals listed above as those
who would be sensitive to problems in the redevelopment of
the area. Responses from these interviewees and related
background information are described below.
1. General
I was surprised to discover that most interviewees disagreed
with my long-term prediction for the economy of Kawasaki and
suspect the applicability of western public-private
partnerships to Kawasaki or Japan in general. They disagreed
with my prediction because they had witnessed the city
succeed in avoiding a regional economic downturn predicted by
economists in the 1970s, and because they forecast over a
shorter term than I did. Though they thought that the concept
of public-private partnership organization that I explained
would be necessary for equitable urban development some day
in the future, they doubted whether it would be applicable to
Kawasaki now or in the near future. The interviewees
suspected the applicability of the partnerships that I
studied partly because information on partnerships was not
sufficient for them to judge the applicability and partly
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because the interviewees believed that Japan is very
different from the U.S. and the U.K. in terms of economy,
politics, and society. Though most interviewees hesitated to
present logical answers to my last question, Professor S.
Watanabe expressed his opinion with a particularly
understandable explanation. I will refer to his opinion in a
later section where I will describe obstacles for forming a
new public-private partnership for Southeastern Kawasaki.
A typical response to my forecast with respect to the
manufacturing industries in Kawasaki was, as Mr. Hashimoto
commented, "the manufacturing industries in Kawasaki does not
show any sign of decline at present though nobody knows if
they might be declining gradually in the long term.' Mr.
Kobayashi suggested, 'probably in a decade Kawasaki will see
no further negatives impact on its community's social and
physical environment.'
Most interviewees justified their optimistic comments by
referring to the fact that the manufacturing industries in
Southeastern Kawasaki has overcome a couple of economic
downturns within a decade. The manufacturing industry has
maintained competitiveness and even transformed itself to
more sophisticated industry with R&D functions strengthened.
In the middle of the 1970s, many machinery builders moved out
of the city because it was time for the renewal of fixed
assets and the Central Government drove them out by enacting
laws to forbid factory expansion and new construction in
urban cities. Facing this, the City worried about an economic
downturn and inner-city problems in the region and sought a
strategy to prevent it.
Thanks to both the need for housing and the quality of small
or middle size companies trading with the large manufacturers
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who move out, the city secured its urban environment from
deterioration. Though the trend of manufacturers' moving out
left land temporarily vacant and much wooden housing
abandoned in Southeastern Kawasaki, many redevelopment
projects created better apartment housing. The trend also did
not hit employees of the small or middle size companies which
had traded with the moved-out manufacturers. Mr. Kobayashi
suggested three reasons for this: first, working class status
was not hereditary, thus unemployment was temporary; second,
the small or middle size companies had been dealing with
technological innovation and did not depend on only one
larger company, thus they survived; and third, "work-away-
from-home" workers, who were the majority of the unemployed
during the downturn, went back home to the countryside and
were replaced by full-time workers. For another decade, he
concluded, industry will be able to sustain its
competitiveness acquired through the absorption of negative
economic changes.
2. Factors of industrial strength
The industries of Southeastern Kawasaki have benefited not
only from the city's advantageous location but also from
their own progressiveness. Mr Aida and Mr. Uematsu identified
the city as one which is in close proximity to Tokyo, the
demand generator, and one which has a highly accumulated
industrial structure. The major industry is high-value-added
"mechatronics," which is the technology of electrified,
computerized production developed in the machine industry.
The mechatronics industry has helped the other industries
accumulate in Southeastern Kawasaki and is a good partner for
the producers of conventional materials, such as steel,
aluminum, plastics, and fine chemicals. 6 These producers, who
employ a large number of workers in the region, are regarded
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as vulnerable to economic depression, but a close
relationship to mechatronics is contributing to their
stability. Comparing Kawasaki to Lowell and Newcastle,
interviewees agreed that these advantages had been sustaining
the area's economic stability and will contribute to do so in
the future.
"A non-double deck structure," Mr. Uematsu commented, is
another characteristic which has helped many industries
accumulate. Small or middle size companies need not deal
exclusively with a large manufacturer to survive because they
own special technologies on which many large manufacturers
have to depend.
In relation to the non-double deck structure, companies,
whether small or large, have been investing in research and
development. Even if service industries replace mass
production oriented manufacturing industries as in the U.S.
and U.K., Mr. Uematsu forecasted, the R&D function of the
manufacturing industries will grow more, and Kawasaki will
continuously be successful in the economy." His forecast is
based on the. fact that the existing manufacturers have
enforced their R&D sections for years. Since R&D needs other
functions, such as top decision-making, management, sales,
and production involved in R&D, the industrial function of
the city will be maintained. The data about industrial
progress collected by the City in 1990 show that Kawasaki is
the most advanced industrial city in Japan.7
3. Concerns for redevelopment
The industries in Southeastern Kawasaki seem to have the
ability to improve their industrial function when
encountering negative economic trends: however, there are
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some concerns. The first is de-industrialization. The cost
increase created by the high currency exchange rate of the
Yen to the Dollar and the high prices of land have decreased
the export of mass-produced goods and forced industries to
move to overseas sites. Some production in Kawasaki has
migrated to Southeast Asia and Western countries.
The second is the highly congested physical environment of
Southeastern Kawasaki from the point of view of industrial
redevelopment policy. Mr. Abe commented that the land use in
the area is not efficient because there are intricate land
ownerships and there is much idle land within factory sites.
The industrial waterfront lacks land which is changeable to
public open space and vistas to the coast. The mixed use area
creates an unpleasant living environment. Both areas lack
sufficient sewage and transportation systems. The land use of
each area is regulated either as 'industrial use only" or
"industrial use with some exceptions including housing and
others." The interviewees regarded this land use problem as
coming from an unexpectedly fast industrial evolution, not as
the result of a scarcity of public policy controlling
resource distribution or urban design. Mr. Aida explained
that the undesirable physical environment of Southeastern
Kawasaki has resulted from the fact that fixed assets and
land use regulations had not caught up with the direction and
speed of change from capital intensive to intelligence
intensive industry.
The third is an image problem. Mr. Koba'yashi was concerned
that the city has been unable to improve its bad image. An
unpleasant urban environment has created a bad image
perceived by the public across the whole country since the
Post War period. He speculated that the city has not
accumulated cultural resources because it is a relatively new
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city to which people started to migrate to live, work, and
locate industries only after World War II.
4. Political power centering on the Central Government
The City also has an administrative problem. The city
planners whom I interviewed commented that there is too much
intervention by the Central Government in decision-making for
the City 's industrial development policy. Until recently the
industrial activities in Southeastern Kawasaki have been
heavily dependent upon a national plan made by the Central
Government. For historic reasons, everyone in Japan has taken
it for granted that the Government will take care of the area
which had brought about the national economic resurgence in
the world economy after World War II. But, politically, local
public officers are seeking to transfer much of the legal
authority out of the Central Government.
The four Ministries that now exercise authority in
Southeastern Kawasaki are the Ministry of Transport, the
Ministry of Construction, the Ministry of International Trade
and Industry, and The National Land Management Agency. Their
purposes of intervention are fragmented and confuse the City
officials. The Ministry of Transport intervenes in the land
use of the waterfront area. The Ministry of Construction,
which administers housing supply through its agency, tries to
promote residential use in idle land. The Ministry of
International Trade and Industry regulates the location and
expansion of factories. The National Land Management Agency
was established some years ago to coordinate the other
Ministries in urban and regional planning and development. It
is implementing a Metropolitan Redevelopment program in which
Kawasaki is regarded as one of the core cities supporting non-
production businesses rather than industry which the City
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wants to support. But other Ministries have continued to
intervene in the City.
Public officers in the planning section of the City and those
of the Ministries seem to argue constantly with each other.
Every time the City makes industrial development policy and
implements it, the four sub-autonomies intervene. Mr.
Kobayashi condemned it as "struggle for the roped place." Mr.
Uematsu confessed, " the City is going its way, not following
the national industrial policy because the policy is not
applicable to Kawasaki at all." Mr. Kimishima asserted that
the Central Government should have a straightforward
administrative structure and a unified policy for the urban
redevelopment of Kawasaki. What is worse, is that similar
administrative boundaries exist in the City. Several years
ago, the City created a new division to deal with the
intervention of the four Ministries, but unfortunately, it
abolished the division because of a bribery scandal involving
the division a few years ago. Mr Hashimoto criticized the
City's efforts in coordinating different interests for urban
redevelopment.
The major part of the fiscal budget of the local government
in Japan is paid by the Central Government's grants every
year. The Central Government has had tremendous power over
its counterparts in approving large scale development. With
over ten thousand authoritative actions, such as approval and
verification, the Central Government is scattering about one
hundred million dollars in over two thousand grant programs
through the prefectural governments to local governments each
year. 8 As long as the local government does not have its own
policy for large scale development, all that it has been able
to do is to follow the Central Government's policies.
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5. More contingencies (pointed out by the interviewees)
To resist influence from the Central Government, the City has
appointed officers and planners with expertise. However,
according to the interviews, the future of Southeastern
Kawasaki will become more contingent upon the fragmented
intentions of governments at different levels, whether
Central, Prefectural, or Local, and those of industries
located in Southeastern Kawasaki. The Central Government, on
one hand, is trying to drive factories out of the area,
allowing ministries to promote different scenarios for their
favorite land use, such as non-production business use
supported by The National Land Management Agency, and
residential use supported by the Ministry of Construction.
The City, on the other hand, is trying to retain industrial
production functions in the area with both non-production
businesses and housing. The Prefectural Government is keeping
its hand off the issue to avoid more political confusion.
Outside the political arena, the industries are leaving their
futures to economic downturns and upturns. Mr. Kimishima
identified a steelmaking and heavy engineering company as the
most important variable for the future of Kawasaki. He
emphasized that the future of Southeastern Kawasaki is
dependent on how the company will change in reaction to
changes in the regional industrial structure because the
company owns 800 ha (1,900 acre), or 50%, of Southeastern
Kawasaki.9
Almost all of the interviewees agreed that it is time for the
local government to emerge as one of the leading
organizations for local urban development. Many Japanese
local governments like the City of Kawasaki have recently
become proactive. For years the local governments have been
condemned for dependency on the Central government for policy-
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making and financing. But recently, they are making efforts
to escape the influence of the Central Government by
strengthening the Mayor's leadership and city officials'
expertise and increasing its revenue from local taxes up to
forty percent of the total, though the residual is still from
grants of the Central Government.
6. Conflict between Prefectural Government and the City
(expressed by interviewees)
On the redevelopment issue of Southeastern Kawasaki, the City
is as hostile to the Prefectural Government as it is to the
Ministries. Mr. Kimishima and Mr. Uematsu expressed the same
opinion----that the Prefectural Government should transfer
all its legal authority for urban planning administration to
the City. They argued that the prefectural city planning
executive council holds decisive power over urban development
projects in cities and hinders the City from making
redevelopment projects in Kawasaki work efficiently. Also,
Mr. Kimishima criticized the Prefectural Government by saying
that the department of commerce and industry, which deals
with the City on redevelopment issues, is divided into two
semi-autonomous parts with separated policies; therefore,
leadership does not exist. Even more surprising is that Mr.
Baba, an official of the Prefecture, asserted that the
Prefectural Government should transfer its authoritative
power in urban planning to the City.
Mr. Baba speculated on a reason for the improperness of the
Prefectural Government in a regional and local political
context. He felt that the current government is a classic
after-image of the centralized Meiji Government from the
late nineteenth to the early twentieth century, because it
was one of the national agencies placed in prefectures by the
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Meiji Government. The conflict between the Prefecture and the
local government has resulted from the fact that the
Prefectural Government has been inclined to represent the
interest of the Central Government but not that of the local
government.
7. Weak local autonomy and underserved citizens
Mr. Baba further commented on the weak authority of local
autonomous bodies in major Japanese cities in comparison to
rural Japan. Because the Liberal Democratic Party, the
Japanese regime, has its constituency largely in rural Japan,
national projects and the government's investment have a
great relationship to the public benefit of rural residents.
Another major constituency of the LDP consists of national
corporations. They support neither the sustainable
development of local economies nor the realization of better
urban environment. The Central Government secures the
interests of the national corporations through cooperative
policy made with national organizations formed by all large
Japanese corporations. Because of the dominant role of
national economic development policy on local policy, the
City, the representative for the local industries and
residents, has not been able to make effective policy for its
constituency. The interests of local industries and residents
are not reflected in the national economic development policy
nor realized effectively by the local policy makers.
Nevertheless, the City tries to work for the community, yet
with an emphasis on care for industry. Therefore, residents
in urban Japan remain underserved.
8. Obstacles to the forming of a new public-private
partnership (articulated by Professor Watanabe)
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Professor Watanabe responded negatively to my question about
the necessity of forming a private sector initiated
partnership organization on the western models that I
studied. Instead of directly denying the necessity, Professor
Watanabe denied it indirectly by expressing his opinion on
the roles of corporations, the City, and residents in urban
development. Presupposing that there is not an absolute
initiative for urban development in Japan, he recommended
that it is the local governments that should initiate urban
development because their bureaucratism and the technocrats
are almost perfect [to carry out efficiently urban
development projects.] Besides the responsihility of the
public sector, he stressed, corporations also should take
corporate social responsibility for urban development, but he
did not recommend that resident should participate directly
and unlimitedly in the decision-making of the City in urban
development. This is not only because, in his view, resident
participation often results in costly projects but because
even without resident participation, the local government can
themselves achieve the objectives for the residents, such as
a better environment, equitable sharing of resources, and the
securing of individual benefits. Nevertheless, he emphasized,
what the Japanese should learn from the western models are
their principles of urban development policy that advocate
the public interest, redistributes benefits generated by the
development to the public, and encourages the public sector
to invest in the local economy.
Professor Watanabe described the style of Japanese urban
development as one which is steered by large private
corporations, not by public-private partnership
organizations. He stressed that it is important to search the
reasons why the institutional arrangement of partnership
prevails in certain western cities, such as Lowell and
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Newcastle, and why the corporatist style is dominant in
Japan. He answered these from three aspects in Japanese urban
development: the nature of the real estate market; corporate
citizenship; and the degree of residents' political
interests. First, he sees Japanese urban development as being
steered by large private corporations, though influenced to
some extent by public institutions, such as central
government-created juridical foundations, municipalities, and
the public sector initiated nonprofit development
corporations called "the third sector.' (the Japanese public-
private partnership sector), The reason for this on the part
of private developers, he explained, is that the Japanese
real estate market mechanism has made urban development a
highly profitable business due to the concentration of
capital and political authority in urban areas: therefore
private developers do not need western style partnerships,
and the public authorities do not feel that they need
partnerships to induce investment. Conversely, in the U.S.
and the U.K. the real estate development business is riskier
for both private and public developers because both people
and capital tend to disperse to the suburbs or other regions,
causing urban blight. But local public entities and local
capital can never move out: therefore, the local governments
responsible for public benefits and the local business
communities aiming at long-term benefit have inevitably
involved themselves in collaborative counter-actions to fight
urban blight through forming partnerships.
Second, large Japanese corporations do not take
responsibility for the social, economic, and physical
improvements of the region where their businesses are based.
Japanese capitalism in his view does not have a human face.
Capitalism with a human face in the U.S. was, he expressed,
characterized by the established principle of corporate
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citizenship which their Japanese counterparts do not hold. He
hypothesized that, if anywhere in Japan, public-private
partnerships on the western model would be necessary in
declining industrial cities, such as Kita-Kyushu, in
Southeastern Japan, where the world-largest steelmaking
corporation are eager to revitalize the urban area after its
major stoppage of steelmaking operation through the
cooperation with the City. But he sees that its objective was
to make use of the public authority to legitimize the
construction of an amusement park for private interest.
Similar to private corporations, he added, are Japanese
universities which usually do not share with the whole
community in which they are based geographically. He
stressed that universities should participate in and provide
expertise for urban development in the region where they are.
The norm of the private corporations without a principle of
corporate citizenship does not require the private
corporations to consider a new public-private partnership.
Third, historically, the residents of large Japanese cities
are politically indifferent. There has been scarce
opportunity for the residents to have interests in places
where they have lived. The residents have not experienced the
rapid, social, economic, and physical changes that have
enormous impacts on their places to live. This contrasts
sharply with the U.S. or the U.K. where, Professor Watanabe
stressed, people are more sensitive to racial issue and class
than the Japanese. The economic changes, such as the
increment in property tax generated by development policies
and projects, have not affected seriously resident's lives.
Japanese property tax is only a tenth of the U.S. Urban Japan
has been built out more intensively than cities in western
countries. As a result, the Japanese residents have come to
think that their voice do not relate directly to their own
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happiness and unhappiness. This mentality allows private
corporations to pursue egoistic corporate ambition, not
carrying out civic duties one might expect in a civic
society. This poor record of citizenship will be discussed
more in the following section.
In short, Professor Watanabe pointed out these factors which
would impede the transfer of my partnership model to Japan:
economic and political centralism; the norm of private
corporations without corporate citizenship; and residents
without citizenship. I agree with him, regarding the social
analysis of the present Japan, but disagree with his view of
the real estate development business. This is changing.
Profitability is decreasing gradually because the inventory
of developable land for large scale projects, except for the
land owned by large manufacturers, has begun to decrease and
private developers have had to participate in cooperative
development projects with land owners. For example, Mr. Abe,
the Kawasaki branch manager of a large private developer,
commented that their role was. changing from a developer who
achieved its projects by itself to one which provides
technical expertise. The lack of corporate and individual
social responsibility would hinder the evolution of a new
partnership, but I disagree with him on the necessity of
public-private partnerships. Ultimately, his opinion
clarified my political hopes for the Japanese community. I
discovered that Professor Watanabe and I stand for two
different models of democracy. This will be discussed in
Chapter 4.
9. Poor record of citizenship
In some interviewees' view, citizenship is not respected in
urban Japan, but this is often said in Japan. Mr. Ito gave
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one example: the preservation of a historical civil
infrastructure. He formed an informal voluntary organization
with interested citizens to preserve a historical mobile
bridge in Tokyo a few years ago. The organization succeeded
in making a sister city contract with the City of Chicago,
Illinois and the City of Leningrad, U.S.S.R. both of which
were promoting the preservation of their historic mobile
bridges. He sees this activity as being on the front line of
the changing history of the Japanese "local resident's"
activities from the mid-60s to the recent time. His theory
was that for about the last twenty five years, the policy of
the 'local resident's" activities has changed from
"opposition-oriented" to "proposal and induction-oriented,'"
and the style of action has transformed from "a resident's
egoism initiative" to "partnership with the local
government." Between 1965 and 1975, some groups of local
residents were driven to oppose actions by the local
government and private corporations when rapid
industrialization caused environmental destruction which
severely affected their lives, yet almost all Japanese were
afraid to involve in such actions. During the last fifteen
years, a larger segment of local residents has come to expect
more, such as a better environment and social learning, as
their fear of resident action becomes less.
However, the magnitude of "resident" activities in Japan
including his has not become a big wave. Mr. Ito explains the
unpoliticized Japanese, particularly those over the age of
forty, as a function of their sense of values. The Japanese
have a fear that political assertion and participation would
label them as "red-flag-communists," which reminds many older
Japanese of the Japanese communists' tragic history filled
with arrest, torture, and death before the Post World War II
period. For the Japanese, it is bad to defy governmental
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authority. What has prevented preservation of historic
architecture and infrastructure are the Japanese mentality
and the Japanese economic system, he said. The Japanese
usually do not like old things and dark places. With a kind
of devotion to their birthplaces elsewhere, they are
indifferent to public values belonging to the cities, their
temporary residence. This is particularly true in Tokyo and
neighboring cities including Kawasaki. There is an old
expression: "Fire and fight are the flowers that blossom in
Edo (Tokyo)." From the economic point of view, the value or
price of land does not reflect the beauty of the environment.
Government has been promoting the 'scrapping & building" of
buildings to stimulate the domestic economy. It has not yet
put favorable tax treatment on preservation. There have been
few chances for "resident's" activities to transform to
"citizen's" ones: thus, in this sense citizenship has not
taken root in Japanese society.
In relation to resident's activities, Mr. Ito mentioned an
interesting gender issue. It is married women that
participate in volunteer activities in Japan. Japanese men
are too busy to leave their work places for volunteering, and
the unmarried tend to be politically immature. Unfortunately,
few of those wives who participate are interested in the
urban environment or urban redevelopment issues. But, in my
view, Japanese females will be politically more active; there
is already an increasing influence of women in politics. The
leader of the Japanese Social Party is female, and most
recently, the voters of Ashiya city elected the first female
Mayor. The percentage of female local politicians to the
total has been breaking records every year, and has reached
5.7% out of 11,397 seats in the last united elections of 85
cities held in April, 1991, though the rate of voting has hit
the lowest percentage of 66.5% due to the fact that one third
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of the candidates were unopposed.10
10. Scarcity of leadership
Many interviewees commented upon the lack of leadership in
both the private and the public sectors. Mr. Kobayashi was
vexed that the groups of owners running a small shop or a
factory in downtown near Southeastern Kawasaki did not have
leaders who could represent the interest of the community and
participate in the urban redevelopment process affecting
their own community. He raised this issue as a factor
mitigating against the opportunity for a western style public-
private partnership in Southeastern Kawasaki. In relation to
this, Mr. Uematsu commented upon the weak leadership of the
Kawasaki Chamber of Commerce & Industry (KCCI), which
consists of almost all local owners running small shops or
factories and representatives from all large corporations
owning regional factories and business facilities in the
city. Both interviewees believed that it is the owners of a
small business in commerce and industry who should have
fostered and built up the local characteristics on their own.
Mr. Uematsu attributed the weakness of the KCCI to the lack
of a communalist sense in the members and administrators. As
a reason for this, Mr. Abe pin-pointed that the KCCI was
dominated by two large corporations, NKK Corp. and Toshiba.
In the same line, Mr. Inoue, a manager of the KCCI,
confessed, that the KCCI once tried to arrange interests of
its members to propose a role for the private sector as a
whole in urban redevelopment for the City but in vain because
the local small business owners focused on egoistic interests
and the decisions made by the large corporation's
representatives were for their headquarters, usually based in
Tokyo.
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Moreover, leadership scarcely exist in politics. It should be
noted that Japan's state craft is different from in other
western countries. As K.V. Wolfren, a Dutch journalist in
Japan, pointed out in his recent book, western governments
are besieged by special interest groups, or are unable to
make up their minds because of inter-departmental disputes.
Yet, as is often seen in international politics,
particularly those with the U.S., the Japanese Central
Government does not present a firm, straightforward policy
and concrete plan to domestic issues which, the Government
senses, will create controversy among semi-autonomous groups.
Wolfren has revealed that Japanese power consists of three
powerful semi-autonomies including certain ministry
officials, some political cliques, and groups of bureaucrat-
businessmen, and of many lesser ones including agricultural
cooperatives, the police, the press, and the gangsters. The
Central Government, for example, has not yet implemented a
sound program to mitigate highly appreciated land prices in
the Metropolitan region. This is because it has sensed that
if it imposes a strict measure, say a high real estate tax,
on corporations owing large land, groups of these
corporations will cut their political donations for the
majority party who lead the Government. Even in the Gulf War,
the Government has shown to the world its shameful
irresponsibility by passing its fiscal budget to include "non-
blood-money-only" contribution to the allied countries. The
Central Government has neither decisive leadership nor a
policy to rule the country in a truly democratic way. The
semi-autonomies are ruling Japan, but no one takes ultimate
responsibility. For the Metropolitan industrial region where
Southeastern Kawasaki is prominent, the Government seems on
one hand to be discouraging manufacturing industries from
keeping business in the region, having already implemented a
set of laws against factory construction and expansion.
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However, its actual urban management policy for the
industrial region is, as Mr. Baba suggested, to observe
changes in the City's policy in industry and the intentions
of the industries, leaving it to the law of economics. The
Government will cope with negative situations after they
occur. As long as the economy is fine, it will not take
measures.
Before moving on to modifying my prediction, it is necessary
to understand the current third sector in Japan, which
includes Japanese style partnerships in urban development.
IV. Problems of the existing partnerships
Though Japan has had few examples of public-private
partnerships contributing to public benefits in urban
development over the years, it recently has witnessed the
growth of organizations in the so called "third sector." The
Japanese definition of the third sector is not yet clear
though the third sector organizations are for profit and have
existed since the middle of the 1960s. It is formed between
the public and the private sector, but the organizations in
this sector are totally different creatures from what I
define as public-private partnership organizations. In the
third sector, the Ministries, Governmental Agencies, and
local autonomies represent the public sector, and private
corporations represent the private sector. By 1989, around
3,900 third sector organizations had been formed, including
non-profit corporate bodies, juridical foundations, and for-
profit companies, over one-fourth of whose capital is
invested by the public sector. 11 Beside them, there are a few
examples of voluntary organizations. Recently, the
establishment of third sector organizations have been
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encouraged by the Central Government policy to make use of
the merits of the private sector. According to a definition
from the Japan Economic Institute (JEI), the third sector is
supposed to have these merits. 12 The private sector, on one
hand, can:
- evade financial risks which often occur at the early stage
of projects, enjoying increased credibility due to the
participation of the public sector;
- shorten a development schedule by regulatory adjustment
with the public sector; and
a contribute to the public good.
The public sector, on the other hand, can:
e' attract investment from the private sector and complement
needed capital investment by large projects;
- make use of the management skill of the private sector;
e adjust given projects for an upper level comprehensive
plan;
a expect that the private sector will participate in the
operation of the projects; and
- realize efficiently the public good.
However, in the Japanese experience, these merits are often
unrealized and the public good is not served. One of the
attributes of Japanese third sector organizations is that
they tend to be a more sub-governmental agency rather than
innovative private initiatives. This is because the third
sector organizations are often formed when the profitability
of a development project is low, yet the public sector has to
launch it for a political reason. According to the JEI, this
situation has caused these problems:
- the project tends to fail due to negative profitability;
- too much intervention of the public side as an arbitrator
or authoritative power holder hinders the third sector from
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taking appropriate actions; and
- the organization does not work efficiently due to
mismanagement or inflexible bureaucratic structure.
Beside of these problems with efficiency and profitability,
there is, I argue, a problem in that the operational duration
of the third sector organizations is too short to contribute
to a wide area. This is because they are formed for single
development projects only. Critics and I also argue that a
number of inefficient third sector organizations have been
created only as retirement-allowance-distributing shelters
for retiring bureaucrats who have little enthusiasm to
represent the public interest. As a result of the public
sector's sharing of capital investment, the retired top
bureaucrats of Ministries or local autonomies occupy
positions in top management and many public officers are
appointed under them, and the huge amount of their wages and
retirement allowances are alloted from the capital
investment. They do not care for citizens participation. For
example, recently many third sector organizations with large
development projects around Tokyo Bay have not held public
hearings. I argue that the third sector development
organizations do not represent public interest. In these
respects, the existing public-private partnership
organizations in the third sector are not suitable for
Kawasaki. A new partnership is necessary.
There are a few public-private partnerships in urban
development in and around Kawasaki. None of them is a long-
term partnership organization serving a large constituency:
they are single or short-term project oriented organizations
and most of them are purely for-profit. The following
examples, two private initiatives and two local government
initiatives, show some of the problems discussed above for
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Japanese third sector organizations.
- KSP Inc. 13
At the end of 1986 the Prefectural Government, the City, the
Japan Development Bank (wholly owned by the Central
Government), and forty-three private companies established a
third sector organization to build and operate an industrial
research complex, called Kanagawa Science Park (KSP), located
in the middle part of Kawasaki. The capital investment
amounted to over three hundred million dollars and the
complex has over three hundred million sq.ft. for research
business incubation, R&D laboratories, office space, hotel
rooms, and conferences. The establishment of KSP Inc. dates
back to 1984 when a national group of companies supporting
the R&D industry held a conference and decided to build
science parks. A key company was a general contractor which
acquired land and put up sufficient capital. First, the
company proposed a housing project, but it disagreed with
local policy, which was encouraging industrial development.
Indicating its industrial policy in favor of R&D, the public
sector induced the company to form a group with private
financial companies for an alternative project, KSP. By this
time, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry was
already prepared with a law to aid the KSP project through
grants and special tax treatment. The public sector approved
the proposal and joined KSP Inc. with one third of its
capital investment. KSP Inc. succeeded in building the
industrial research complex in cooperation with the public
sector, but it cannot be a model organization for
Southeastern Kawasaki because the area needs an organization
whose goals and functions reflect the problems and needs of a
larger community.
- Ohta-ward Urban Development Conference (OUDC) 14
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Ohta-ward is one of twenty-three local government areas under
the metropolitan Tokyo government. The ward is an industrial
area similar to Southeastern Kawasaki. The machinery
processing industry, which manufactures parts of precision
machines and electronics, prevails in a congested physical
environment. In 1987, OUDC was formed voluntarily by a group
of member companies of the Ohta-ward Branch Office of the
Tokyo Chamber of Commerce and Industry (OBO/TCCI), a private
business organization, to make and propose redevelopment
plans for the whole community under the Ohta-ward government,
Tokyo metropolitan government, and the Central Government.
The OUDC was successful in coordinating the different
interests of private companies and proposing redevelopment
plans, but could not succeed in achieving any one of the
plans.
The announcement of the airport expansion plan, a national
project, motivated small and middle sized local companies of
the OBO/TCCI to make plans by themselves. This was because
the redevelopment opportunity for vacant land generated by
the expansion plan of Haneda International Airport would
certainly have had a tremendous impact, whether negative or
positive, on the area's industry and the whole community. The
OUDC has worked vigorously for the last five years, with
members increasing from thirty to one hundred and fifty. At
present, the OUDC still exists but, in effect, is almost
inactive because it failed to win the bid for the vacant land
against a private real estate company in 1989.
A group of the twenty key figures in the OUDC were CEOs from
middle-size local industrial companies, leaders from unions
of local commerce, and a representative of a district
development organization. The OUDC chose a membership system;
each member pays a small fee. To increase legitimacy and
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authority as an organization, the founders invited two
planners from an urban development consulting firm and
middle class managers from one hundred of the national
corporations, which were also members of the OBO/CCI and
interested in project-making.
The OUDC was successful, Mr. Abe explained, because the OUDC
did not have one predominant large corporation. It had an
interesting structure which carefully balanced the interests
of the member companies. In general, it is difficult to
mitigate the difference of power between small and middle
sized companies and large corporations. The structure
consists of four groups of meetings: the Executive meeting,
the Staff Meeting, the Chairmen's Meeting, and four Project
Study Group Meetings. (I will refer to this structure in
Chapter 4 when I build a final public-private partnership
organization model for Southeastern Kawasaki.)
- Shin-Tsurumi Working group
The public and the private sector in Kawasaki has just
started to form an organization which can be described as a
public-private partnership movement. But I do not regard this
movement as serving the public benefit because it is
triggered by a single project, is too pro-development, and
excludes the general public.
In 1988, the City formed working groups to make a new
expressway project work with each of the companies whose
factory sites were crossed by the expressway construction
siter plan. The City planned to build the expressway without
eminent domain because the site for the project is too large
for the City to exercise the authoritative power to assemble
needed land. Before the working groups were formed, the City
decided the route of the expressway would cross a particular
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company's site because the City happened to know that the
company, which owned the largest part of the expressway site,
began to move out due to an economic downturn in its market.
Yet, the market has revived since the Japanese government
chose domestic economic development policy to avoid a
political dispute against the U.S government on unbalanced
trade issues. The revived market for the company made the
course of the expressway project complicated because the
company eventually became reluctant to move out. At present,
the City and the companies involved are discussing
alternatives for the project in their working groups.
In addition to the pro-developmental role of the public
sector, other corporations have joined the story as actors to
coordinate interests of the involved companies which own
large parcels of land for their factory sites. A nationwide
real estate development company and a public development bank
have stood up to work indirectly for the project by supplying
developmental expertise to them. Their objectives are to
arrange the different interests of private companies whose
land and factories are crossed by the expressway plan and to
achieve both the expressway and redevelopment projects. This
is still an informal transaction, but it is becoming a
primary source of power to make the projects happen. However,
the general public is excluded and the developers are steered
by private benefits.
- Kokan Street development study group
The area along Kokan Street is one of the major development
sites which the City has identified. Most of the area is
owned by a steelmaking and engineering company which is the
largest land owner within Southeastern Kawasaki. Though the
City expects the company to initiate the improvement and
redevelopment of the area, the company's viewpoint, public
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benefit concerning? or private profit only?, has not yet
been clarified. In 1985, the City established an advisory
board to study the future plan of Southeastern Kawasaki by
appointing thirty members from academia and public
institutions, the private sector, and civic organizations.
The board started a series of symposia, and Kokan Street was
selected as one of the development project areas in the final
proposal. Understanding the City's interest, companies owning
land in the area voluntarily formed a group for a preliminary
development study. The City is putting its own development
policy into the discussion of the group in order to align the
companies' interests with those of the City. The steelmaking
and engineering company is expected to be an initiator, but
it lacks expertise in urban redevelopment with which the
public benefit should be concerned.
Japanese third sector organizations would be considered as
public-private partnerships to realize public benefit through
urban redevelopment. But, actually, they are not suitable
because they tend to be a more sub-government agency rather
than efficient private initiatives. I have already pointed
out some problems within the sub-government organizations.
First, the public side intervenes too much in decision-
making. Second, the organizations do not work efficiently due
to mismanagement or inflexible bureaucratic structure. Third,
their operational duration is too short and their objectives
are too narrow. The final problem is that they were
established to pay a retirement allowance for public
bureaucrats.
With a couple of local partnership organizations above, the
problems of Japanese third sector organizations suggest that
it is not sufficient to look at the inside of a small
boundary to build a model partnership organization for
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Kawasaki. To explore a couple of existing public-private
partnership organizations overseas can be an instructive
approach. In a later chapter, I choose one from Newcastle,
England, and one from Lowell, Massachusetts and compare them.
But, before moving on this comparison, I need to modify my
prediction for Kawasaki, referring to the trend and problems
indicated in the interview, and check the analogy that I
speculated about at the very beginning of this thesis.
V. Modification of my prediction
Based on these interviews I do not feel that I have to revise
my long-term prediction substantially. But I reconsider
several issues considering what the transfer of a partnership
structure from one society to another entails. To make clear
what problems were identified through the interview and the
study of Japanese third sector, I summarize them below.
1) Deindustrialization causing mass-production to out-migrate
to overseas sites.
2) Highly congested physical environment: insufficient
infrastructure, pollution, and the lack of urban beauty.
3) An bad image of the city created by its history of
industrialization with a neglected urban environment.
4) Political centralism and the fragmented Central
Government.
a) too much intervention of Ministries in the local
government
b) local government budget's dependency on the Central
Government
c) the Central Government's influence on the City's
economic development policy making
5) Political fragmentation of the Central Government and the
Prefectural Government which has resulted in an ununified
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regional land use policy
6) The dominance of large corporations in land ownership
7) Conflict between the Prefecture and the Local Government
8) Weak local autonomy
9) Underserved citizens
10) Economic centralism which has formed the profitable real
estate market
11) Scarce corporate citizenship to take social
responsibility
12) Poor record of citizenship
13) Scarce leadership in both the private and the public
sectors
My prediction, on the other hand, was based primarily on
these points:
a) Economic downturn from a long-term perspective with
negative impacts on the community's social and physical
environment
b) Aging population
c) Massive immigration
I also pointed out some problems within the Japanese third
sector organizations.
a) The public sector as a partner intervenes too much in
decision-making;
b) The organizations do not work efficiently due to
mismanagement or inflexible bureaucratic structure;
c) Their operational durations are too short and their
objectives are too narrow; and
d) They were established to pay a retirement allowance for
public bureaucrats.
My economic and social prediction needs only minor changes
though, except for 2), 3), 9), and 11), I did not consider
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the problems pointed out by my interviewees when I made my
prediction. First of all, there seems to be little fear of a
severe economic downturn in the short-term which will have
some mitigating effect on my long-term prediction. This short-
term perspective leads to a modified diagnosis that Kawasaki
might be able to sustain its competitiveness and therefore,
the possibility of negative impacts on its community's social
and economic environment decreases to some extent. However,
this optimism ignores the effect of deindustrialization
pointed out by an interviewee. With the consideration of both
the aging population and the magnitude of possible
immigration, both of which no interviewee commented upon, the
evaluation of deindustrialization has a significant negative
impact on the long-term local economic growth prediction. The
negative impact of aging population and massive immigration
on the long-term social change also affect the economic
growth. A question that the interviewees would ask me is
whether these three issues, deindustrialization, aging
population, and the magnitude of immigration, are
quantifiable or not. Deindustrialization depends on changes
in the world economy; the immigration is contingent upon the
foreign and domestic policy of the Central Government. The
prediction of the immigration issue is especially difficult
at present because Japan seems to be clearly divided into pro
and con.
Despite these contingencies, each of the three issues is
already showing a negative trend.The population is
quantifiable and getting aged. Substantial number of
foreigners with illegal status are migrating and causing
conflicts with local communities. Part of production has
moved out. The three issues are inter-related and cannot be
overlooked. It is clear that the situation of Southeastern
Kawasaki is changing in accordance with my prediction.
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Much more significant is that the presented socio-politico
problems of Kawasaki suggested to me a totally different
implication for the transfer of a new partnership
organization on the western model. Regardless of the
difficulties in economic prediction discussed above, the need
for a new partnership organization is even higher because:
first, the organization can solve the political problems from
4) to 9) by providing a forum for discussion among
governments from all levels, the dominant private
corporation, and the public; second, with regard to 10), the
organization can secure public benefits by ensuring that the
real estate market will not be overheated; and third, as for
11), 12), and 13), the organization can foster both corporate
citizenship and individual citizenship through stimulating
both within its members. However, I have discovered that my
attempt to transfer a new partnership organization implies
the challenge to upgrade the existing fragmented society to
another in which all entities can share benefits in urban
redevelopment. In this respect, a new public-private
partnership organization, I believe, can be the best tool, or
agent, to transform'Japanese society with the negative social
factors indicated by many interviewees to a better society in
terms of democratic urban redevelopment.
Though the identified trends and problems in the interview do
not affect my prediction, I have to reconsider how the
economic analogy employed in this thesis is valid, before
moving on the following chapter. At the very beginning of
this thesis, I speculated that Newcastle and Lowell share
with Kawasaki similarities in terms of the history of
industrialization and these similarities would suggest the
possibility or desirability of establishing a new public-
private partnership organization for Kawasaki as a solution
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for the city's problems in urban development. It is crucial
to specify how the pattern of deindustrialization in both the
U.S. and the U.K resemble that of Kawasaki. From the
interview, I discovered that the manufacturing industries in
Kawasaki have the ability to adjust and strengthen themselves
reacting against negative economic circumstances. Because
this ability is quite-different from that of British or
American manufacturing industries, Kawasaki seems to be
economically strong forever. But deindustrialization is a
trend which will happen whether one likes it or not. In the
U.S., under the pressure of international competition
manufacturing industries moved out of Northeast and Midwest
to West, South, or South America, seeking cheaper labor. The
U.K. had a similar trend. Japan is no exception. It has
already faced harder competition with developing countries
for larger share in some industries, such as steelmaking and
shipbuilding, and is losing substantial shares. The Japanese
textile industry's production has already depended on South
East Asian countries. The hot bed of the Japanese labor
market is shifting from traditional industries to the service
industry. In Kawasaki, 60% of total labor is in non-
manufacturing industry. Japanese younger people are becoming
unwilling to take jobs in the manufacturing industries.
Simultaneously, illegal work by unskillful overseas labor is
increasing in the manufacturing and construction industries.
In this regard, my analogy in economic history is valid.
Though I have to admit difficulty in extending this analogy
to the Japanese and western real estate development
businesses, current negative trends mitigate the difficulty.
The concentration of capital and political authority in urban
Japan has made real estate development a highly profitable
business. Conversely, in the U.S. and the U.K. the real
estate development business is riskier for both private and
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public developers because both people and capital tend to
disperse to the suburbs or other regions. There are a couple
of trends mitigating the difference between Japanese and
western real estate development businesses. The profitability
of Japanese urban real estate is decreasing gradually,
because the inventory of developable land for large scale
projects, except for the land owned by large manufacturers,
has begun to decrease, and private developers have had to
participate in cooperative development projects with land
owners. So does the public sector developers. These factors
increase the validity of the analogy concerning similarities
in the real estate market.
I also have to consider social or political differences
between Kawasaki, Japan, and the U.K. and the U.S.when
building a model organization. Important are four issues
related to the problems of Kawasaki: the fragmented political
relationship among governments at different levels; the
unwillingness of private corporations to take social
responsibility; the poor record of citizenship; and scarce
leadership in both the private and the public sectors. If
these issues turn out to have significant influences on the
evolution process, structure, and functions of either case
study organizations, and have distinctive differences among
the countries, the applicability of the model to Kawasaki
would be low. But these are not necessarily critical as
Japan's history suggests. Every time the Japanese tried to
transfer institutional knowledge and models from overseas,
cultural and political differences always followed. Yet, the
cultural and political differences were not serious
obstacles. For example, Japan learned from Germany for its
constitution before the current one, imitated England for its
government structure, learned capitalism from the U.S, and
transplanted its current constitution from the U.S. without
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major conflicts. Currently, Japanese private corporations are
learning the concept of corporate cultural contributions from
France. In these examples, cultural and political differences
have been ignored rather than considered as obstacles. From
the view point of democracy, in a later chapter I discuss
the social implication of transferring partnership on western
model to Kawasaki and articulate what elements of comparison
are important for Kawasaki.
In' the next chapter I introduce two western public-private
partnership organizations. I chose The Newcastle Initiative
(TNI) from Newcastle, England and The Lowell Plan Inc. (TLPI)
from Lowell, Massachusetts because I believe that these two
cities and Kawasaki share similarities in terms of their
history of industrialization and I hoped that these
similarities would articulate the necessity of a new public-
private partnership for Southeastern Kawasaki as the best
solution of the city's problems in urban redevelopment.
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Chapter 3. The Newcastle Initiative (TNI) and The
Lowell Plan Inc. (TLPI)
I. TNI
As Mr. Peter Stark, the director of Northern Arts, a regional
cultural development organization, pointed out its
characteristics, the city of Newcastle is impressive in its
unique, coherent, and compact urban form. This uniqueness is
evident in the harmonized mixture of tradition and modernity
in the urban area. The central district includes business,
commercial, entertainment and cultural, educational, and
public uses. The city is formed mainly by limestone-
architecture, medieval in style with a monumental obelisk as
a central point. Architecturally distinct buildings include a
theater, central railroad station, churches, university and
other institutions. The current northern boundary of the
major commercial district is formed by a stone wall of the
Roman period. Along the commercial streets of the district, I
found many Victorian buildings, which had been residential
and are now being used as offices and retail shops. But the
commercial district is run down and is the focus of
redevelopment schemes by a local development initiative.
Within the city, the residential area surrounding the central
district is serene. It consists of both traditional tenement
style residential buildings and mansions. The modern
atmosphere of the city is reflected in the civic center, a
large shopping center, a sturdy steel landmark bridge over
the Tyne River, and an efficient public transportation system
with buses and subway. Despite the various styles of
architecture within the city, harmony exists. The old retains
its distinct characteristics. Furthermore, the efficient
transportation system ties together every part of the city
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and its suburban area and makes the whole area more compact
than it otherwise would be.
Usually, it is not an easy task to explain the atmosphere of
a city logically. But, the physical environment of Newcastle
impressed me so much that it made me feel that the people
living here embrace common values in such a comfortable
setting. In a similar way, I found that leaders of the city
have a loyalty to the community, yet, in one interviewee's
words: "it is difficult to explain 'loyalty to the community'
to people living in London, Paris, New York, or Tokyo [or
Yokohama or Kawasaki] where such loyalty seems to be rather
odd."
TNI, The Newcastle Initiative, is one of the most recently
created public-private partnerships in Great Britain. It is
an organization primarily led by the private sector although
it is a combination of both the public and private sectors.
It was established in mid-1988 by local business leaders in
cooperation with leaders from the public sector and academia.
It is "a campaign led by leading figures in the life of the
city to build Newcastle's status as one of the great regional
capitals in Britain."1 It is a non-profit organization, which
has been registered by the Registrar of Companies of England
and Wales as a company limited by guarantee (Appendix A).
Interestingly, the participants in TNI, including its staff,
are all self-sufficient in terms of wages and are paid by
their own institutions, not by TNI. They are tied together in
a consensus, a vision of the whole Newcastle community as a
regional capital in Britain (North East of England). Ten
leading figures from local businesses, the public sector, the
local authority, and academia comprise the Board of TNI,
which makes strategic decisions affecting Newcastle's future
development although TNI itself has neither a source of funds
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nor a financing tool for this development. These decisions
are legitimized through the approval of participants from the
public sector or the local authority, although TNI does not
have any statutory power as a public organization. A fulltime
chief executive, Mr. Hay, was appointed by British Telecom
from its own executive staff to lead the Board and organize
activities within TNI.-
II. TLPI
In the U.S., Lowell is often thought of as the most developed
industrial city in the 19th century and the birthplace of the
American Industrial Revolution. Dennis Frenchman, a faculty
member at M.I.T., calls the city "a machine city." It was
characterized by large-scale, intensive textile manufacturing
with brick mills which directly connected textile machines to
the water power generated from the Merrimack River. It is
this industrial-history-telling heritage that inspired a
resident activist to propose an unprecedented urban park
concept to revitalize the local economy and the whole
community. In the late 1970s, the National Park Service and
the Lowell. Historic Preservation Commission started
implementing the National Historical Park program in the
city. A few years later, The Lowell Plan Inc., a private,
nonprofit economic development corporation was founded. TLPI
has become a major component of the city's revitalization. In
recent years, many tourists and residents have enjoyed
festivals and events held primarily by TLPI for the promotion
of the city as a desirable working and living place.2
In my thesis research on public-private partnerships, I
became interested in the relationship between institutions in
urban development and in community based economic development
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in Lowell. There are three different institutions that are
making efforts to revitalize the local economy which, like
Newcastle, experienced a decline in the 1970s. The Lowell
Plan Inc.(TLPI), a private non-profit economic development
corporation, the Lowell Development Finance Corporation
(LDFC), a non-profit economic development finance corporation
working with TLPI, and the Coalition For a Better Acre (CBA),
a community-based development organization serving the Acre
neighborhood in Lowell. In this section, I describe the
goals, projects, and programs of TLPI, LDFC, and CBA, and
examine the relationship among these three institutions.
TLPI is not related to the CBA but works closely with the
LDFC, The CBA is a borrower of funds from the LDFC. Although
the three institutions currently have significant impacts on
the local economy, each of them was created by different
interests and in different times. LDFC was created by loaal
financial institutions in 1975 to contribute to the local
economy with low interest loans to primarily industrial and
commercial building owners and tenants for the rehabilitation
of their properties. TLPI was created by local business
leaders four years later. It has been revitalizing the
economy by providing technical assistance for business to
start and develop in the city and by attracting investments
to the city from private individuals and firms. It also has
been working with City, State, and Federal officials to meet
the needs of the evolving economy by providing a forum for
public and private collaboration. CBA, on the other hand, was
founded by local churches, Hispanic groups, and Acre
residents in order to stop a City sponsored housing plan
which would have destroyed the Acre's low income
neighborhood. This initial founding purpose has evolved to
more integrated objectives for the community groups which
include economic development, community organizing, and
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housing development as well.
The ten year-long-efforts of the public-private partnerships
organized by TLPI with LDFC seem to have resulted in an
amazing success in Lowell. The city has had both economic and
cultural successes. The rate of increase in the average
income level of the city is the highest in New England. The
investments made in the local economy attracted by the
partnership efforts during this period exceed 400 million
dollars. 2 The national headquarters of Wang Laboratories and
offices of a number of other high tech companies have been
built. The city has been reborn as a National Urban Historic
Park, which is a tourism oriented city transformed from an
economically depressed city by a federally underwritten
National Urban Park program. The population of the city has
grown by twenty-five percent in the last decade and the
downtown is often crowded with tourists on weekends.
The City's success story, however, has a dark side. Along
with increased economic growth came property speculation and
rising real estate values, and the influx of a young
professional gentry seeking interesting places to live. The
older neighborhoods of the city suffered skyrocketing rents;
living conditions were in bad shape. The Acre neighborhood of
Lowell is one of the poorest in the state and for decades has
been neglected by the economic development efforts made by
the development institutions including the City and TLPI.
In the following chapter, From the view of democracy, I
compare these two public-private partnerships that I have
introduced. For this cross-case analysis, I focus on six
variables: the process of evolution, goals and objectives,
structure, responsibility, style and type of action, and
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regional characteristics in economy, politics, and society.
For each of these, I provide readers with summary charts and
tabulated information on the two partnership organizations.
Narrative comparison and detailed descriptions follow the
charts and tables.
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Chapter 4. Cross-case analysis
I. Implication of institutional transfer and crucial socio-
political factors
Where the applicability, or the transferability, of an
institutional model is examined between countries, it is
useful to categorize the social and political characteristics
of the countries and identify what factors are crucial to the
applicability. A model which differentiates the types of
democracy is helpful to analyze socio-politico differences
among the countries. To distinguish the dominant society of
the U.S., the U.K., and Japan, I employ five models that Jon
Van Til summed up in his book 1:
1. Neo-Corporatist society------focuses on the predominance
of large, bureaucratic organizations in modern society. The
principal force is identified as the profit-seeking
enterprise, with economics identified as the major concern
of human beings in society. Voluntary organizations are
viewed as a particular form of enterprise from this
perspective, and volunteering is perceived as a value-
linked, and inexpensive, surrogate for governmental action
and responsibility.
2. Pluralist society-------centers on the pluralist theory
of democracy and places its central attention on the roles
of interacting associations in society. The principal force
in this conception is the concerted action of institutional
actors, with each of the three sectors providing important
parts in the symphony of the effective partnership.
3. Populist society------ gives center stage to the
citizen in a struggle against the mega-institutions of
corporate and governmental life. The drama here is one of
confrontation against institutional injustice, with one
part of the voluntary sector, that of independent citizen
action, providing the leading role, and all other cast as
"heavies."
4. Idealist society------ stresses the gains from a full
and reasoned dialogue among citizens and leaders of the
various societal organizations. Active citizen
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participation is given a central role, and distinctions are
drawn between forms of action on the basis of their
contribution to the goals of full democracy
5. Social democratic society------places its emphasis on
the reorganization of relations of power and economic
control in society. Central is the reduction of the role to
provide ownership in corporate organization and political
life. The voluntary sector is provided only an ancillary
role in this conception, although various politically
related voluntary organizations are seen to be central to
the process of assuring productive social change.
Professor S. Watanabe stands for the neo-corporatist model,
affirming its specific features, such as economic centralism,
a lack of corporate social responsibility, and an ignorance
of citizen participation. My view is that this type of
society has been responsible for an unpleasant urban
environment and the insufficient representation of public
interest. I believe that this corporatism should be
transformed by some force to pluralism. My attempt to examine
the applicability of the model partnership organization to
Kawasaki is not merely a proposal of an efficient development
method for the community, but a challenge to upgrade the
existing social structure to another which can improve the
negative social factors of Japanese society indicated by many
interviewees.
Til's models highlight a dominant relationship among major
entities, including government, private corporations,
nonprofit sector, and the citizens in many countries. In my
view, Kawasaki, or urban Japan, falls into model 1, the
corporatist model. Lowell, or middle-size American cities,
falls into model 2, the pluralist model. Newcastle, or middle
size British cities, fall somewhere in between the two. Table
1 differentiates the three cities by using factors which
reflect the characteristics of a corporatist society and a
pluralist one. These factors would impede the model
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partnership from working if the model organization is
transferred.
The factors in Table 2 are crucial to a model partnership
organization for Kawasaki. They suggest that it is better to
select a basic structure in accordance with the area's
democratic context.
Table 2. Differentiation reflecting two models of democracy
Model Corporatist<---------->Pluralist
City S.Kawasaki Newcastle Lowell
Country Japan The U.K. The U.S.
Organization N/A TNI TLPI
1) Is there political centralism? 0 o
2) Is the business community 0 o
a hierarchical society?
3) Is there economic centralism 0 o
outside of the city?
4) Is there clear geographical o 0
discrepancy in terms of social
structure (eg.,white vs. blue
collar)?
5) Is there the shift of more 0 0
responsibility to the private
sector in urban redevelopment?
6) Is there rich record of o 0
citizenship
7) Is there the tradition of 0
corporative philanthropy, or
corporate citizenship?
8) Is ethnic diversity a O
social value?
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If the area's democracy become similar to that of Lowell, or
say, pluralistic, TLPI is an better choice; if it does not
seem to change so much, TNI is better. The table articulates
that TNI is more likely to fit Kawasaki than TLPI because
Kawasaki is more similar to Newcastle than to Lowell in its
socio-political nature. It also suggests that there would be
a two-step dynamic model: one similar to TNI, and the other
similar to TLPI. If the society of Kawasaki changes to a more
pluralistic society over time, the two-step dynamic model
will be applicable. In the following cross-case analysis, I
articulate what this comparison implies to the modeling of a
public-private partnership organization for Kawasaki,
referring to the factors discussed.
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II. Cross-case analysis
1. Evolution
TNI
The failure of
- regional assistance policy
for British industries
The central government
The overall decline
of national economy
~' I
Increasing
discrepancy
between the South
and the North
Redundant economic I
development
policies
The proliferation
of urban develop-
ment organizations
The confusion of
leadership and
policy in urban
economic
regeneration
The perceived
successes of
American
public-private
organizations
The cutbacks in
regional industrial
r assistance
Impact
Newcastle
Serious recession
Urban blight
The loss of confidence
in the whole community
I
The local
business community
The rise of
loyalty and a
sense of local
identity
in the whole
community
<A
The shift of
more
responsibility to
the private sector
CBI, a national
business community
The initiative
to identify the
role of the
private sector
in urban
regeneration
Stimulation
Local activists
A proposal for a
cultural
development
Support of
the City
and other
authorities
TNI
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Motivation
to form
an unprecedented
partnership with
the public sector
TLPI
The over all
decline of
national
economy
Local social
conditions
Diversifying
ethnicity
Increasing
conflicts among
different ethni
c ommunities_
The tradition
of
corporate
philanthropy
Growing economic problems, fiscal
constraints, and anti-tax sentiments
on the part of the public
The federal government
The cutbacks in !The shift of more
regional and local 'responsibility to
economic developmentithe private sector
Impact
Lowell
Stagnated economy
and Urban blight
The loss of faith
in the whole community
c
The local
business community
SThe rise of
~~loyalty and
a sense of local
identity in the
whole community
The precedent Motivation
successes of to form a new
Northeastern and partnership
Midwestern
partnership
sorganizations _
LDFC
support
Stimulation of
a senator and
a city officer
(the public
sector)
A local resident
activist
and a public
agency
The recognition of
Special physical
resources and
the National Urban
Historic Park
Program
City
support
TLPI
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Comparison
The patterns of evolution of TNI and TLPI depicted in the two
charts are surprisingly similar, It is interesting to wonder
whether or not one can generalize from the evolution process
of both organizations for modeling a partnership organization
for Kawasaki.
There are many identical phenomena, incidents, and thoughts
between the two charts, though the Newcastle business
community formed TNI after researching TLPI as a model
partnership organization. In general, the core of the pattern
is the rise of loyalty and a sense of local identity in the
community, and it led to a motivation to form a partnership.
The impetus for this loyalty and identity is the local
economy-caused urban problems, such as economic decline,
urban blight, the community's mental depression and despair.
Part of the political backgrounds of these urban problems is
the policy choice of the central or federal government to cut
regional and local economic assistance. With local activists
and the public sector, the central government stimulate the
local business community by shifting more responsibility to
regenerate the local economy to the private sector. The
lessons of successful partnership organizations might
encourage the local business community.
Differences between the two evolution processes are as
interesting as the similarities because they suggest several
different aspects between England and America in terms of
social values and politics. First, traditionally, the British
business community had not acted as a corporate philanthropic
body unlike its American counterparts until the birth of TNI.
The concept and activities of charity existed in the U.K.,
but they had not been adopted by the for-profit sector. In
the U.S., on the other hand, philanthropy has been the major
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social value that makes for-profit organizations participate
in the non-profit sector. Second, ethnic diversity is also an
important American social value that distinguishes itself
from other parts of the world. Third, the South-North
discrepancy would represent Britain's sensitivity to class
while the whole American community does not have a clear
sense of class. Fourth, the presence of the Confederation of
British Industries (CBI), a national business community which
promoted movement toward public-private partnerships in
England, makes me feel that British business communities
place importance on a communalistic society in which national-
level society leads local-level one. As far as I know, there
are no nationally unified and politically influential
business communities in the U.S., and, in my view, American
companies are relatively independent. Finally, the British
central government is increasing its authority to intervene
in regional and local economic development, while the
American counterpart is trying to be a relatively small
government. In the Northeast, this political centralism has
created redundant regional economic development policies with
proliferating regional agencies which confuse local policy.
This is one of the reasons that a partnership was needed.
According to Mr. Hay and the TNI's brochures, the two key
events which gave birth to TNI were the October 1987
conference of the CBI held in Glasgow and a subsequent dinner
meeting held in London in January, 1988. The CBI decided to
involve itself in the local economic regeneration of their
cities and chose Newcastle as a pilot case.2 In the following
meeting, three representatives of Newcastle decided to test
out a model partnership based on American cases. There were,
however, other significant contributing circumstances for the
Newcastle business community at both a regional and local
level. By the end of the 1970s, the North East region had
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experienced the failure of central government's policy in
regional industrial assistance. During the following several
years, the region suffered a recession with a declining
economy, serious unemployment, and the so called "inner city
problem." These resulted from the central government giving
up its regional industrial assistance policy. But, this
serious recession gave the business community the impetus to
raise loyalty and a sense of identity to the city. The year
1987 was momentous in that the Conservative Party was
reelected as the ruling party and refocused its policy on a
market oriented economy. This gave the business community
many opportunities and the motivation to .regenerate the
regional economy. One result was that the business community
established TNI.
Some local activists had stimulated the movement for a
partnership between the public and the private sectors. Mr.
Peter Stark, Director of Northern Arts, a regional arts
development agency, was one of them. He had been motivating
local leaders to promote collaboration among the public and
private sector for urban regeneration of Newcastle through
the promotion of the arts and entertainment industry. Local
business leaders other than the three members of the CBI
mentioned above were other important activists in the
establishment of TNI.
Local leaders began to think about the necessity of
revitalizing the local economy in the late 70s and early 80s.
At that time, almost all cities in the U.K. were experiencing
substantial deindustrialization in the major industries
including manufacturing, heavy engineering, shipbuilding, and
mining. As a result, they suffered serious unemployment
problems. Scotland, Wales and North England, including
Newcastle, had an unemployment rate of over 20% in their
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urban areas, much worse than in the South. In the Newcastle
area, Mr Hay pointed out, local confidence had reached the
bottom, people had lost pride, and the region was filled with
despair. Local leaders then began to question what was wrong,
and what was not being done and started thinking what should
happen beyond that black moment in regional history.
J B Goddard's report on regional economic development in the
North of England shows how deep the problem was. He
articulated that the region's poor economic performance
resulted partly from its political and economic dependency on
the capital London.3 The poor performance in the economy dated
back to the 1930s, he pointed out, when the region lost local
control over industry. The headquarters of national companies
created through the merger of regionally owned companies
moved out of the region. During the post World War II period,
traditional heavy industries continued to decline and more
control flowed outside the region. Goddard termed such an
economy a "branch plant economy" with five distinguishing
characteristics: first, most regional employment depended on
firms owned externally; second, state subsidies had a major
role to attract new investment to the region; third, the
development of the national expressway system and telephone
network enabled mass production facilities to disperse to the
regions from London; fourth, most of the regional labor
population was the working class; finally, central government
dominated regional economic development by nationalizing
major heavy industries, providing infrastructure, and
financially supporting regional industries. Goddard described
other actors. Local government, dominated by the Labor Party,
focused on social welfare and depended on the grants of the
central government. Trade unions came to have a strong
bargaining power influencing regional economic development.
But the business community was less involved in it. The
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region depended on London both politically and economically.
There was a recession between 1979 and 1983. A great number
of factories closed and their workers were out of jobs. This
recession happened, Goddard explained, because central
government cut regional industrial assistance, recognizing
that the way to organize the economy both nationally and
regionally, described above, could not work. 4 In 1987,
Margaret Thatcher, the leader of the Conservative Party, was
reelected as the Prime Minister and enforced the promotion of
capital market oriented economic development. This was a
factor leading to the birth of TNI. In 1987, the Glasgow
conference of the Confederation of British Industries (CBI)
decided to set up a taskforce to identify CBI's role in
assisting urban regeneration and chose Newcastle as a pilot
case. In the next meeting in 1988, three members of the
taskforce from the North East decided to form a partnership
organization in Newcastle.
Goddard's criticism went further. Though the U.K had
experienced some economic recovery since 1983, the region had
had a slower rate of recovery than the national level with
its male unemployment increasing relative to the national
average. The regional economic history indicates a growing-
discrepancy in performance between the poor North and the
rich South.5
However, there have been some changes in the regional
industrial structure. Small high-tech companies have been set
up and have been successful in the creation of new labor
demand. Slowly, firms in traditional industries are renewing
and transforming old products 'by adopting new technologies.
They are contributing to diversifying the industrial
structure for stable economic health. Though the assessment
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is early, as Goddard claimed, prevailing overseas investment
in the region might have a positive impact on its industrial
structure. Overseas manufacturing industries, mainly
Japanese, set up plants in the region. Goddard indicated some
economic analysts' criticisms that the jobs created by the
Japanese firms are offset by the closure of 11,000 jobs in
closure of other foreign, especially American, firms. But, he
expects that Japanese investment may be more permanent than
that made previously by American firms. 6
Despite these negative economic conditions, the region
experienced a substantial percentage increase in employment
in the banking, finance, and insurance industries, while
other parts of the service sector experienced decline or
smaller increases. According to Goddard, most of this
increase in the region between 1978 and 1989 occurred in
Newcastle which was ranked ninth in the nation. He explained
that three factors generated the increase: the growth of
local demand, the expansion of multi-locational firms from
London for the acquisition and merger business, and the
dispersal of back offices from the capital. 7
In my view, the period around the end of 70s was the moment
when the strongest loyalty emerged in Newcastle. There is no
doubt that worsening regional economic problems forced it to
emerge at this point in time. For about five decades from the
1930s the northern regional industries were subject
politically and economically to the South. TNI's
establishment was for regional regeneration, but in a broader
sense, it was, in my opinion, the last solution for the
problematic capital-region relationship. The rise of the
financial businesses in Newcastle gave significant momentum
to TNI. It is apparent to me that some leaders from that
industry with loyalty to the whole community played a major
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role to stimulate other leaders' loyalty encouraging them to
form the partnership.
Besides the emergence of loyalty to Newcastle, a powerful
group of the private sector at the national level began to
struggle against the depressed British economy, whose central
issue was seen as the "inner city problem". The force of that
movement was generated by the Confederation of British
Industries (CBI), an organization comprising the major
corporations in the country. CBI was chaired by Mr. Tom
Flost, CEO of the group of National Westminster Bank group,
the biggest bank in the U.K. In 1987, the Conservative
Government was reelected, and Prime Minister Margaret
Thatcher put the inner city problem high on the Government's
agenda. This encouraged the CBI to face up to the problem.
CBI held a conference among its members in Glasgow to debate
the roles which they should take in order to revitalize the
economies of their cities and, to assign each city,
established fifty teams including John Hall, developer, Paul
Nicolson, Chairman of TWDC (CEO of Box Breweries Co.), and
John Goddard, Professor from the North East region. In 1988,
to study successful partnerships, some of the CBI teams
visited cities in North American, such as Vancouver, Toronto,
Pittsburg, Baltimore, Boston, and Lowell. From the study, the
CBI concluded that there were three fundamental elements
necessary to the revitalization of U.K. cities 8:
1) The business community in all the major cities in the U.K.
should provide leadership;
2) Public funds for revitalization are scarce, so private
investment through ordinary market mechanisms would be
necessary; and
3) The process of revitalization should include [a] physical
rebuilding, [b] job creation in the service sector with
training and recruitment programs, [c] community involvement,
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and [d] a public-private partnership.
Though the movement for a partnership went swiftly from the
national level to the regional level, "there was tension,"
Mr. Hay expressed, between TNI and the City because the Labor
Party constitutes 80 percent or more of the City Council.
Thus the social welfare oriented City government did not
always agree with TNI's policies of profit-making property
development by investment depending on the market. But it
does not mean that the City government is not enthusiastic to
regenerate the local economy. According to Goddard, urban and
local policy became prominent in the 1980s after central
government decided to get rid of its regional industrial
assistance programs.
Thus, TNI was created out of a complicated relationship among
development agencies that have a variety of responsibilities
for coordination of development policy concerning regional
economic revitalization. Although these agencies, including
TNI, continue to make efforts to revitalize the regional or
local economy, Fred Robinson points out that there is still
no major development organization which can take a lead role
in economic policy.9 But, in my view, it is TNI that has the
potential to take a lead role in local economic policy and
influence regional economic policy. This potential is
inferred from the profile of the members that TNI invited.
There are three development agencies whose leader joined TNI:
the Tyne and Wear Urban Development Corporation (TWUDC), a
City Action Team (CAT), and the Northern Development Company
(NDC). The TWUDC is a "QUANGO" (Quasi-Autonomous Non-
Governmental Organization) that was created in 1987 by
central government to exercise direct control over regional
economic development. With a huge budget, the TWUDC has been
trying to regenerate the economy of the riverside areas by
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undertaking projects through "Enterprise Zones,"a financial-
incentive-added industrial park equipped with infrastructure,
to attract private sector investment. While it is quite
separate from local government, the agency is seeking full
cooperation with private sector interests. The CAT was
created in 1984 by a central government department dealing
with employment issues in an effort to insure more effective
co-ordination of central government policy measures in the
inner areas of Tyneside. The NDC, another region-wide
agency, was established in 1986 by the business community,
trade unions, and the local authorities. It was concerned
with changing the image of the region and coordinating
sections of industry---e.g. by inviting and locating
Japanese auto-makers in the region. Incidentally, there are
other organizations funded by central government for regional
economic development. Goddard lists, for example, two inner
city Task Forces and two City Action Teams. Under such
complicated relationships among a variety of players, TNI was
formed by the local business community and has linked the
different players, the local government, and academia.
Why was TNI formed despite the various development programs
in operation? The proliferation of development organizations
described has a large array of policy programs which seem to
be redundant. As Robinson indicates, these include the
Regional Selective Assistance, the Urban Program, the
Enterprize Zones, the Urban Development Corporations, the
Training Agency, the Gateshead National Garden Festival, the
European Regional Development Fund, and the European Social
Fund. 1 0 The current annual budget of all these amounts to over
E300 million ($600m). Goddard considers the regional
development grants or regional industrial assistance programs
as having been a well known failure in the northern region.
He claims that they failed to reduce the region's
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overspecialization in declining traditional industries, or to
stimulate industrial innovation, R&D and small businesses for
industrial diversification. This was because a large part of
the grants flowed to a few well established large
corporations in the region. This failure of regional
development policy has turned policy-makers' emphasis to
urban and local development programs since around 1980. The
Urban Program, the Enterprize Zones, and UDCs are examples. 11
To be optimistic, TNI may intensify the effects of all these
programs because it has leaders from the organizations
related to them. But it seems to be rather difficult for TNI
to perform efficiently with the proliferation of programs and
organizations.
I see TNI as an essentially pro-development small efficient
government. TNI benefits private corporations, though, Mr Hay
stressed, the Board members never pursue a direct personal or
corporate benefit. TNI is registered as a company limited by
guarantee, which means that the members may not distribute
profit among them. This does not define TNI as a non-profit
organization, but allows it to make profit unless the members
distribute the profit among them. TNI probably will help
outside corporations make a profit whether TNI intends to do
so or not. With its members' expertise, it can propose
redevelopment projects for particularly blighted areas in
light of the authorized schematic plan made by the City.
These projects are approved promptly by all the members of
the organization. The different public agents at different
levels can cooperate together and therefore, make projects
more efficient. It tries to realize public benefit, also.
Besides property redevelopment as its major interest, it also
deals with employment for a poor community in a particular
area, it helps graduates get a job, and supports the arts and
culture, business and education, and craftsmanship. Thus TNI
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serves the whole community just like a public organization.
However, there is a missing part: input from the general
public. TNI is indirectly serving the whole public and
directly a particular part of the public. It has a team to
provide jobs and training opportunities for the long-term
unemployed in Newcastle and held public meetings with
merchants when it made' blue prints of redevelopment projects
which would have an impact on their business. But it does not
have any representative of citizens. The Board members of TNI
are self-elected leaders from well established organizations
and corporations. They have votes to appoint new members but
will not appoint either small retail shop owners or
individual activists. The constituency for TNI is limited to
elites in a big business community and the public
administrator's community. The goals and objectives seem to
be sound for the public benefit unless one questions the lack
of citizens' and the indigenous small business community's
involvement.
To understand the evolution of TLPI, it is meaningful to look
first to the generic evolution of public-private
partnerships in the U.S. and particularly in the Northeast.
This region has been a hot bed for public-private partnership
and philanthropic activities since in the 17th century
Massachusetts colony witnessed the first establishment of
partnership corporations for public purposes. According to
R.S.Fosler, both the public and the private sectors have come
to regard partnership as a useful institutional arrangement
in order to achieve public benefit as government-corporation
relationships and national and regional economic conditions
change. 12
From the end of the Roosevelt administration's New Deal era
through World War II to the post War period, cities in
79
regions other than the Northeast benefited from distinguished
service of both the public and the private sector. They also
benefited from the growing power of the federal government
which overshadowed state and local governments. But,
municipal governments and local business communities in the
Northeast, such as Pittsburgh and Baltimore, had to cooperate
in order to tackle the deterioration of the downtown
economy. 13
In the 1960s, national corporations began to have the notion
of corporate social responsibility to improve social
conditions and stabilize regional and local economies. The
norm of a five percent contribution to the community
exemplifies the notion. The corporations recognized
opportunities for public-private partnership to carry out
philanthropic, community-based activities and real estate
developments for blighted neighborhoods and deteriorated
downtowns. Some of the corporations located their important
facilities in distressed areas. 14
In the 1970s, the Carter Administration shifted more
responsibility from the federal government to localities due
to worsening economy, fiscal constrains, and anti-tax
sentiment of the part of the public. The Reagan
administration, advocating the New Federalism, accelerated
the shift to the localities by cutting federal socio-economic
programs in the early 1980s, and states and cities in the
Northeast and the Midwest needed to utilize new public-
private partnerships to tackle the economic downturn in which
firms left the central cities of the Northeast and Midwest.
The partnerships were different from those of the previous
three decades in that the'local government could not rely on
the federal government's support and therefore had to rely
more largely on the private sector. 15
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After the Carter administration introduced the UDAG program
to states and cities for urban redevelopment, The Lowell
Plan, Inc. (TLPI) was formed in 1979. It is officially said
that a politician and the then City Manager founded TLPI. Its
establishment, in my view, resulted from a couple of leaders
from the public sector who stimulated the local business
community to raise their loyalty and sense of local identity
to the whole community. Despite the inducement of the public
sector for the start-up of TLPI, the major participants are
from the private sector, In fact, the Mayor only took part
formally in TLPI several years later.
TLPI was founded under a stagnated local economy and an
ethnically conflictual society. Lowell is often seen as the
most developed industrial city in the 19th century and the
birthplace of the American Industrial Revolution. A group of
merchants and engineers planned and constructed the city not
only as a machine-wise system with housing, social
institutions, and amenities but as a socializing system which
enforced on employees, mainly female, a life style of
discipline, morality, and education. During the first half of
the 20th century, Lowell experienced a fifty year economic
depression when its textile industry began to lose
international competitiveness and left the city to the South
seeking the cheaper un-unionized labor. 16 This resulted in
long term unemployment and urban blight, and economy had been
stagnant until the late 1970s when TLPI was founded.
Two social trends which surrounded the TLPI's birth were the
richness in ethnicity and the ethnic conflict. All through
the periods of the economic rise and decline, non-Americans
continued to immigrate to the city. The tension among
different ethnic groups increased due to their competition
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for scarce resources, and they lost faith in their ability to
make use of their enormous human resources. Even at present,
many immigrants are entering the city, and some are involved
in ethnic conflict.
There are, in my opinion, several factors explaining the
evolution of TLPI besides the local business community's
loyalty, a sense of identity to the whole community, the
stagnated local economy, urban blight, and the loss of faith
in residents caused the local business community. First and
second, the bottom line of the TLPI's evolution bore the
tradition of corporate philanthropy and the federal
government's retrenchment in regional economic assistance.
The recognition of national corporations on social
responsibility in the 1960s induced TNI's partnership to
evolve, matching the change of the federal government in its
regional and local economic development policy through out
the following two decades.
The third factor was the success of other partnership
organizations in the North and Midwest. This factor helped
the founders formulate a better partnership model. Three
partnership organizations would be used as the model: the
Allegheny Conference on Community Development in Pittsburgh
in the 1940s, the Greater Baltimore Committee in the 1950s,
and the Citizen's League of Minneapolis- St.Paul, Minnesota
more recently. 1 7 All of these are private initiatives that
involve the public sector. Their primary tasks are planning
and policy-making for housing, economic development,
education, or other fields, including but not limited to real
estate development. The ACCD regarded itself as "a citizens
group of the Allegheny Region" aiming at proposing an overall
community plan for the region. The GBC's purpose is "to
function as a citizen arm of the government to provide
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business and financial expertise to help implement city
projects." The CL is a civic organization including
individuals and non-profit organizations, as well as
businesses. Its responsibility is to develop the idea of
public service and projects benefiting its community.
The fourth was the establishment of the LDFC by the regional
and local banks and financial businesses in Lowell. The LDFC
is a non-profit community bank to help residents and
merchants improve residential and commercial buildings and to
help businesses build industrial buildings. The members of
the LDFC and TLPI are almost the same, and currently the same
person is the executive director of both organizations. This
implies to me that the LOFC was a first attempt by the
business community to play a role in urban revitalization.
But, the LDFC's function was limited to low rate loans.
18
New functions of partnership as a planning body and marketing
and promotion force for identified redevelopment projects
became necessary for the public sector's growing expectation
of the private sector's involvement in urban revitalization.
The final reason is the -special and historical urban setting
of Lowell. It inspired the unprecedented idea of a national
historic park which identified a potential for the whole
downtown Lowell as a park which would tell visitors and
residents the history of the American industrial revolution
and social changes in the community. This physical advantage
has made it possible for Lowell to benefit from federal and
state funds and private contributions. Projects for the
national historic park program started in the late 1970s.
TLPI is a non-profit private corporation whose goal,
according to a catalogue published by TLPI in 1979, is " to
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make Lowell the best, most livable mid-size city in
America. "19 As time passes by, TLPI's function has changed
from a planning and policy making body acting through
property developers to a marketing and promotion force. TLPI
has used its nonprofit structure to attract resources
including charitable donations, grants, and bequests.
Hired by TLPI In 1980, the American City Corporation made
recommendations on how the city could encourage economic
reinvestment. Recommendations included real estate
development projects of commercial and cultural facilities,
improvements in the arrangement of roads and parking space,
and the promotion of tourism. Following these
recommendations, TLPI has raised a substantial fund from the
public and the private sectors and allocated it to
recommended projects. TLPI is working together with the
Lowell Development Finance Corporation (LDFC), a non-profit
private financing organization formed by local financing
companies in 1974. TLPI identifies entrepreneurs with
industrial development projects sound enough to generate
substantial employment needed within the city. Then, TLPI
provides technical assistance to the projects in order to
make them happen. The LDFC, on the other hand, provides
financial support to them, bearing some risks with lower than
the market level return. It also pays the director and
staffs of TLPI. Beside these project-making tasks, TLPI
markets and promotes the city as a place to live and locate a
business through market research and holding various events.
TLPI has evolved from a planning and policy making body to a
marketing / promotion force with a financing function through
asking the whole community to donate.
Implications
TNI's evolution suggests that there is not yet a high
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possibility for the establishment of a new partnership
organization for Kawasaki if everything in Kawasaki is
unchanged. Kawasaki and Newcastle have several differences,
which would negate the birth of the organization. First, a
large steelmaking and engineering corporation will have
tremendous influence on the redevelopment of Southeastern
Kawasaki due to its dominance in land ownership. Second,
Kawasaki has the political centralism which is different from
that of Newcastle in that the Japanese Central Government is
badly fragmented among several sub-autonomous Ministries.
Third, the City of Kawasaki is conflicting with the
Prefectural Government on the City's inferiority of authority
in city planning to the Prefecture. Fourth, historically,
large cities like Kawasaki do not have sufficient political
influence to national policy-making due to the dominance of
the ruling party whose constituency is largely in rural
Japan. Fifth, Kawasaki do not have local leadership in its
commerce. Finally, there is a poor record of citizenship:
therefore, residents do not participate in the process of
urban redevelopment.
Besides the shared circumstances shown in Table 3, Kawasaki
share with Newcastle some other circumstances in which TNI
was formed. These circumstances are: lack of corporate
philanthropy; hierarchical society; political centralism; and
undiversified ethnicity, or less pluralistic society. Though
the possibility is minimal, the analogy that TNI's socio-
politico situation is similar to Kawasaki in these respects
would imply that a new partnership organization similar to
TNI can come about in Kawasaki.
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Table 3. Common situations
S.Kawasaki Newcastle Lowell
1) Are there political, or 0 0 0
economic, or social
problems affecting the whole
community or its urban
physical environment?
If any, policy failure in economic
development? *1 0 0
economic decline? *2 0 0
social?-----ethnic
conflicts? *3 o 0
2) Is the real estate development
a risky business o 0 0
3) Deindustrialization causing
mass-production to 0 0 0
out-migrate to overseas sites.
4) Aging community 0 0 0
0: represents "YES."
o: represents "YES, yet to the lesser extent"
*1: Some possibilities due to the political confusions of the
authority of governments at each level.
*2: As explained in Chapter 2, some possibilities due to
deindustrialization.
*3: As explained in Chapter 2, some possibilities, if
national policy has changed.
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2. Goals, objectives, and related issues 20,21
TNI
To produce a steady
growth in local
employment
To produce an improved
urban environment
-To produce the maximum
possible contribution to the
whole North East region
Regional and local economic
revitalization
I (Ultimate goal)
TLPI
(Ultimate goal)
To make Lowell the most
economically viable and
physically attractive
city of its size in
America
To realize a vision as a "regional
capital"
TNI TLPI
1) To provide a forum for (Stated but not clearly as
discussion between executives objectives)
from the public and private
sectors
--- -------------------------------------------------------
2) To identify major flagship 1) To market and promote the
schemes which can symbolize city by campaigns as a
Newcastle's regeneration in better place for housing
tangible form and attract
commercial support and busi-
nesses from the private sector
--- -------------------------------------------------------
3) To monitor and facilitate 2) To support existing
the work of TNI project private real estate
taskforces responsible for developments and public
the implementation of the projects
flagship schemes
--- -------------------------------------------------------
4) To promote national and 3) To provide new businesses
international interests in with financial and technical
commerce and opportunities supports
in Newcastle and its region
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TNI TLPI
5) To inspire growing pride and 4) To encourage cultural and
confidence among the people of educational programs
Newcastle in the future of
their own city
6) To link business and education
Comp~arison
The TLPI's goals and objectives, on the one hand, have had
the opportunity to change for the last eleven years; yet the
TNI partnership has had more opportunity to learn from the
successes and failures experienced by other partnerships in
the U.S., including TLPI. It is interesting and instructive
to see how different both partnerships' goals and objectives
are, because they may suggest some hints of success for a new
organization to be proposed for Kawasaki. However, in
general, the goals of nonprofit development organizations are
not critical to the question of whether or not a organization
is successful, because their goals are so similar and generic
that one cannot distinguish one organization from another.
Such goals include seeking and realizing development
projects, increasing employment, improving the physical
environment, and strengthening a sense of community. Both
TNI's and TLPI's goals cover these so that it is hard to
distinguish them. They are comprehensive and long-term but by
themselves do not tell me how distinctive each partnership
organization is, in what sense each city is different from
other cities, and what differences are worth being
strengthened by the activities of each partnership.
The objectives of both organizations show their
distinctiveness. Responding to different economic
circumstances, both have the same starting point but
different ways to reach their goals. According to the
objectives tabulated above, both partnerships seek to provide
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a forum for the private and the public sector as a starting
point. The provision of a forum with the public sector
implies that a group of leaders from the local business
community has regarded the negative circumstances which the
whole community has faced as an opportunity for them to
contribute to the whole community. But TNI's objective 4) and
TLPI's 2) and 3) point out different strategies. Besides,
substantial international capital has been invested in the
Northeast of England, TNI, on one hand, pursues mainly
commercial projects and "the development of commercial and
cultural links with Japan," such as Japanese restaurants,
gardens, and a material arts training center. The TNI's
interest reflects the favorable reaction of the Newcastle
community to current investment made by the Japanese
manufacturing industries. On the other hand, no international
capital has been invested in Lowell, but there have been on-
going projects led by TLPI itself and the City, and other
organizations, such as the LDFC and agencies of the National
Urban Park program. Most of these have utilized charitable
donations, grants, and bequests from domestic sources and
have aimed at the same goal of economic revitalization for
Lowell. Thus, objectives of both organizations are well
linked to the specific situations.
Implications
'A partnership development organization in an area will not
be able to get enough support from the public if its goals
are too generic even though its objectives reflect the area's
specific economic circumstances. TLPI does not pay particular
attention to getting support from the public; TNI, seems to
be more sensitive to public support, though it is not
necessarily enthusiastic about it. My study shows that both
organizations do not include input from citizens in their
decision-making. Perhaps, their ways fit in their political
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landscapes in which citizens are more active to bring their
interests in political arenas than Japanese. But, from my
view, I believe that the redevelopment of Southeastern
Kawasaki, in particular, needs to involve the public in its
process. In this regard, the goals of a model organization
for Kawasaki should articulate its potential to open up a way
to democratize various communities, and the objectives should
be specific to respond to Southeastern Kawasaki's situation
and problems. It is desirable to differentiate the uniqueness
of the partnership organization of Southeastern Kawasaki from
other ones. The goals of the partnership should suggest
social change from a corporatist democracy to a pluralist
one. Proposed goals are:
-To promote a democratic and efficient development process
in Southeastern Kawasaki and to present a sound policy for
redevelopment and implement it by coordinating different
interests and balancing benefits for different entities.
The objectives, on the other hand, should also reflect the
specificity of Southeastern Kawasaki pointed out by my
interviewees. From the summary in Chapter 2, I identify these
issues as criteria for the objectives: the unpleasant urban
environment (2), bad image of the area (3), the confusion of
governmental policies and authority (4, 5, 7, and 8), the
speculative real estate market (10), and the problem of
individual and corporate citizenship and leadership (11, 12,
and 13). My proposal is:
-To mobilize citizens to participate in the urban
development process.
-To solve the governmental policy confusion by providing a
forum for governments from all levels, the dominant private
corporations, and the public.
-To secure public benefits by controlling the real estate
market so that it will not overheat.
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-To promote efficiently the rearrangement of land use to
realize a better environment and a better image of the city
by managing the exchange and purchase of land according to
redevelopment plans for housing, commercial districts, and
industrial sites.
-To foster both corporate citizenship and individual
citizenship through stimulating each other within its
members.
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3. Structure, function, and membership 20,21
Structure and function
TNI
Board of Directors (16)-------paid by their own organizations
Bi-monthly meetings
-To make efforts to bring about public benefit within the
TNI's scope of goals and objectives
-To make strategic decisions affecting the city's future
development.
-To provide leadership and expertise necessary to the
development projects
-To discuss general schemes of revitalization, narrow them
down to specific issues, and
identify particular economic, cultural, social, and
educational revitalization projects
-To set up Taskforces for the projects
-When agreed by a simple majority of the Board members, a
specific project is formally
adopted by TNI for promotion: then, a Taskforce will be
created.
Chairman (1) from a regional saving & loan company
----- with the right to vote
Senior members (11)-----with the right to vote
Private corporations (9)
Financial institutions (2)
Media (2)
Developer (1)
Other industries (4)
Academia (2)
Invited members (4)------without the right to vote
The City (1)
Quasi-county government (1)
Quasi-public agency (1)
Central government agencies (1)
Leadership skills
Expertise
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Executive Director's Office--paid by their own
organizations
-General administration
IExecutive Director (1),
Telecommunication company
Assistant Directors (2)
Staff members (2 to 3)
Project Taskforce A,B....
-To implement assigned project and, if necessary, prepare a
financial package, relying on outside financial
institutions, or set up a trust, or other means
-The members of the Taskforce are drawn from among the
Board members
Projects and programs
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TLPI
Board of Director (25)--------paid by their own organizations
Monthly meetings
-To propose a project and programs to realize the goals
-To provide swiftly the data, funding, staff, and
collective business skills necessary to advance the
proposed projects and programs
Chairman (1), President (1), Vice-President (2),
Treasurer (1), Secretary (1) from the private sector
Senior members (25)
-Private corporations (19)
Financial institutions (5),
Media (1),
Hospital (1),
Developer (4),
Other (8)
-The City (3)
Mayor
City manager
Director of Planning & Development
-Quasi-public organization (1)
Regional Chamber of Commerce & Industry
-Academia (2)
\/
Expertise and
leadership skills
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- Executive Director's Office---------paid by the LDFC
/TK
-Administration
-To encourage individuals and organizations
inside and outside the city to make donations
and administer the pooled donations to
distribute to projects and programs.
Executive Director (1),
(The Ex-Director of P&D)
Assistant Director and Staff (3 to 4)
Private Donations Public Funds
Federal and state
grants
Deposits from
other financial
institutions
Partners (approx.150
companies and individuals
in commerce & industry)
The adaptation of a proposal
If agreed by a simple majority of members.
Programs and Projects
95
Functional characteristics
TNI TLPI
-Free from bureaucracy -Free from bureaucracy
-Dynamic and flexible
-Planning and policy making 'Technical and financial
(Board) support for city-wide
eProject making (Taskforces) economic regeneration
-The exclusion of the financing *Cooperation with a
function nonprofit financing
organization
eDonations and funds from
corporations, individuals,
and public organizations
Membership (members' relationship)
TNI TLPI
-Private sector initiative with -Private sector initiative
membership from the City, local that involves the City
economic development
organizations, and academia,
and the business community
eSelf-selected members *A wider membership through
-Balance of power in decision- donation
making within the Board 'Some fears of a large
national corporation's
influence in collective
decision-making within
the Board
'The public sector does not have 'The public sector has the
the right to vote right to vote
*Weak citizen participation 'Weak citizen participation
Comparison
To prepare for the later chapter where I will build a model
public-private partnership organization, I have to clarify
the relationship between the members of the Board (Appendix
B.) and their companies, which I consider one of the most
important structural factors. Principally, the member who
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participates in the partnership is an individual rather than
a representative of a corporation. The formations of both
partnerships were possible because the status of participants
from the private sector was not simply "private companies
representative', but as an "individual" with professional
skills who had loyalty to the whole community. In this
respect, both partnership organizations are not a partnership
of public and private sectors, but a partnership of local
private and public leaders. If the participants from the
private sector were representatives of private companies, TNI
and TLPI would not exist simply because a private company-
controlled partnership would be unable to prioritize long-
term public interest before private profit. Conversely, if
the member is simply an individual who does not have any
close relation to corporations, a partnership will be
workable, but, it will be a less effective and less efficient
organization. Both partnerships have been able to evolve as
effective and efficient organizations to realize public
benefit through economic regeneration because both concepts---
-- individual social responsibility and corporate social
responsibility----- have been established as impQrtant social
values in the whole communities where both partnerships have
evolved. In other words, citizenship and corporate
citizenship have enabled both partnerships to evolve.
As for membership, both organizations are inflexible.
Particularly, the Board members from private firms were
exclusively top executives. Also they were self-elected and
their memberships are almost permanent. Any condition
requiring one's position in a company cannot be found in the
goals or objectives of both organizations, and there is no
necessity for permanent membership. Why do both organizations
include top business executives as Board members and
permanent member? In my view, there is only one reason: top
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executives of local private firms have invested so much
capital in their city and devoted their own lives so much to
their own business based there that they can never abandon
them. They cannot permanently leave the city. This would be
the source of loyalty and an important qualification as a
member of a nonprofit public-private partnership
organization.
At a glance, both partnerships seem to share a similar
structure, similar functions, and similar membership;
however, there are several significant differences. The most
distinctive difference is the availability of the financing
function. In terms of capital gap, TLPI with a financing
function is filling the gap by gathering donations and funds
from outside sources and investing them in marketing and
promotion activities. TNI, or its taskforces, on the other
hand, rely on the market mechanism when they need financial
packages for projects though some of their projects form
trusts. According to Henry Hansmann's classification depicted
below, both organizations fall into the donative /
entrepreneurial (B) nonprofit sector. 22 His matrix uses two
criteria: the source of income (Donative or Commercial?); and
the means of control (Mutual or Entrepreneurial?). If the
power to elect the board of directors is in the hands of the
organization's patrons, the organization will be referred to
as "mutual." If the board of directors is self-perpetuating,
the organization will be called "entrepreneurial."
Mutual Entrepreneurial
Donative (A) (B)
Commercial (C) (D)
To emphasize the difference between the two organizations, I
divide the donative source of income into these two:
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personnel expenses only (B-1); and personnel expenses and
funds for programs and projects (B-2). TNI falls into (B-1);
TLPI falls into (B-2). TLPI's financial sources are donations
from private companies, other organizations, and individuals,
and grants from the federal and the state governments. TLPI
also works closely with LDFC, a non-profit financial
corporation. As discussed in the last section, the
availability of financing reflects investment circumstances
of both cities. The same respect should be considered when a
partnership organization is proposed for Kawasaki.
The second set of differences is with respect to dynamics and
flexibility. Being free from the evils of bureaucracy would
be a distinctive feature of both partnerships if I underscore
the formal positions of TLPI, such as Chairman, President,
Treasurer, and Secretary. But, TNI has a more dynamic and
flexible structure than TLPI. In essence, the TNI's Board
sets the general direction in which each Taskforce goes, but
basically does not intervene in the details of what the
Taskforces do. In the decision-making process, the Board-
Taskforce relationships are very flexible and informal
because the Board consists of all the members who participate
in each Taskforce, and the members can easily bring in and
out any problem and idea between the two autonomies.
Leadership is also changed flexibly from one leader to
another according to the stages of the project. In contrast
to government, these dynamics and flexibility are major
merits for a public-private partnership organization.
There are a few minor differences. The first is the public
sector's right to vote in decision-making. TNI does not -
include it; TLPI has. This would indicate a subtle difference
in the role of the public sector. TNI's public sector members
would be more like advisors than those of TLPI who would be
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members equal to the business leaders. Therefore,.TNI would
be more of a private sector initiative than TLPI. (This does
not however mean that TNI is for-profit.) Another is the
degree of influence from political ideology. TNI would be
freer from political ideology than TLPI due to its cross
membership among more various public and quasi-public
organizations and agencies than those of TLPI. TLPI has only
one public organization, the City. It is impressive that
despite hierarchical British society, a dynamic and flexible
organization like TNI has evolved. This is instructive
particularly to Kawasaki because from my interviews I found
that Japanese society is as hierarchical as British society.
Implicat ions
Even if a public-private partnership organization is formed
for Kawasaki, it is unlikely for the organization to include
a financing function based on donations. This is because,
related to individual's and corporate citizenship, there is
no tradition of donations. Individual's and corporate
citizenship also will be critical factors for the
establishment of the partnership organization because they
are the major mental sources of leadership and philanthropic
activities. Both types of citizenship have not been
considered as important in society, and leadership is weak
particularly in local commerce. Besides, large national
corporations dominate the local economy.
Human resource is also a crucial factor. There is the
scarcity of human resources of such top'business executives
that have invested so much capital in their city and devoted
their own lives so much to their own business based there
that they can never abandon them. In this respect, the model
partnership organization should provide the local, small or
mid-sized business owners of the Kawasaki Chamber of Commerce
1.00
& Industry with an opportunity to recover its status as
coordinator of all the businesses in Southeastern Kawasaki,
balancing power between large corporations and small or mid-
sized companies. I discuss later how to balance power in such
an organization.
The participation of residents is a more difficult issue for
a model partnership organization for Kawasaki to handle than
for TNI and TLPI. As long as Kawasaki is a city in Japanese
corporatist society, residents as a whole are always a
'second entity, " which subordinate to both public and private
corporations. But the exclusion of resident participation is
not suitable for the area where residents are seriously
underserved in terms of the political representation of their
interests. One possibility for solving this problem is to set
up a two-phase dynamic model organization. In the first phase
the public sector and residents are placed on advisory
status. This will fit present Kawasaki where the governments
at different levels have confusion and fragmentation in
policy and authority, and residents are not yet politicized.
This partnership organization's priority in the first phase
will be conceptual redevelopment project proposals. In the
second phase the whole community will be politically active
enough to form organizations: therefore, the partnership
organization should modify its structure to respond to these
social changes in the following three respects. First, to
allow governments and citizens to participate in the decision-
making, the organization should designate the right to vote
for them. Second, to involve the governments and citizens in
building public-benefit concerning opinions, the organization
should formalize public discussion groups for them. Finally,
to make its activities financially accountable, the
organization should have.financing function with fund-raising
capability.
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4. Responsibility
Legal responsibility
TNI 23 TLPI
By charity laws or common-law: -Tecatr ofheISr
To realize public benefit which cmo-a
the law recognizes as charitable, Tesm sTI(R
such as: §0()3 eie
(i) public amenities including , opoi raiain
the repair of bridges, ports, asognzdndpetd
and highways, the preservation exlsvyfo
of the countryside and the caial upss
country's architectural heritage,
and the establishment of public
(i-Th chartersen of thedIRSror
commerc,agriucommon-l wi
The lw proibit TNI rom The same arhis TNI IoS
Notnoprfi organizationsrgaiza
tioas oranze and operated fro
any surplu exclusively fufor
(irie advacemetrioft iutry,
disotrbuting prisoamon
Moral resp~onsibility
TNI TLPI 24
Be trustworthy to other members 
-Alike: -The duty of loyalty
and the public to the ultimate charitable
beneficiaries and the
commands of the charitable
charter
-The duty of care
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Comparison
The legal definition of both organizations as nonprofit
derives from the common-law which defines charitable
purposes. TLPI is defined a nonprofit or tax exempt
organization by Section 5501 (c)(3) of the Internal Revenue
Service. According to Weisbrod, TLPI is one of "the public
type nonprofits that g'enerates sizable external benefits to
persons who do not help to finance the organization's
activities." TNI, on the other hand, is registered by the
Registrar of Companies in England and Wales as "a company
limited by guarantee," (Appendix A) which is one of three
institutional forms for "charitable" purposes in the U.K. In
these definitions in the two countries, the word "charitable"
is common and defined by the common-law. I summarize the
concept structure of both "a company limited by guarantee'
and "charitable" purposes by quoting Michael Chesterman's
book, "Charities, Trusts, and Social Welfare. "The legal
definition of both organizations as nonprofit derives from
the common-law which defines charitable purposes.
"A company limited by guarantee" is an appropriate legal form
for TNI in two respects. First of all, the democratic
function of the form suits TNI's activities undertaken
collectively by a group of people, not by an individual.
Second, the legal prohibition against profit distribution
among members could make the public trust that TNI has
committed itself to stand for public benefit so that the
public politically support TNI.
However, both TNI's and TLPI's structures have a legally
ambiguous relationship between the Board.members and private
firms that they represent. It would be easy for the
participating leaders to manipulate the course of activity
for their own benefits, and the benefits would be huge
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because the member's companies are not small institutions.
British and the American laws prohibit the distribution of
profits among members, but the judgement on the non-
distribution of profit would be difficult in a case in which
a member's private company benefits from a project
implemented. In this case, a portion of the profit earned by
the company flows back to the member as his or her income.
The maintenance of a member's high public interest motivation
is left to the individual's goodwill. This is more
commonplace in the U.S. and the U.K., though it is in the
Japanese experience where officials of public organizations
working closely with the private sector are often involved in
bribery cases. Some years ago, the City of Kawasaki abolished
its new urban redevelopment division because the chief
officer of the division was involved in a scandal with a
private developer. This scandal caused the resignations of
some high ranked Diet members and the resignation of the
Prime Minister. In this respect, from a Japanese maintaining
high motivation of the participants turned out to be more
important than legal responsibility when I asked the
question: Don't the members have a limitation in realizing
their goals and objectives and the representation of the
public interest?
For example, Mr. Hay stressed that each participant in TNI is
aiming at a personal contribution to improving the Newcastle
community as a whole, not personal benefits from their
decisions made in TNI. He put it: " [In other developments in
other areas] there are some efforts from which people have
gotten direct beneficial interests. They are developers and
landowners. But essentially, what we have tried to do is to
bring forward a team, none of whom would have substantial
personal benefits." TNI has a constitution stating that
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members may resign at any time, or may be asked to resign by
the unanimous vote of other members, while TLPI, as far as my
study is concerned, does not. However, in my view, neither
these individuals' goodwill nor written regulations are a
sufficient mechanism of moral control. Sustaining high
motivation cannot be secured by the assumption that the
members' ultimate profits are self-realization, which gives
them the highest satisfaction of all in their lives.
The maintenance of motivation is left not only to members'
goodwill. The strong tie among the members reflecting their
pride as both a responsible individual and highly ranked
business leader is a mechanism to maintain motivation.
Members are all executives, whether they are from the public
or the.private sector. It is difficult for them to risk their
social position by seeking private benefit. There is a more
important mechanism. Some incentives may control high
motivation. From the Japanese experience, I cannot conclude
that the sense of philanthropy or self-realization will be
sufficient incentives. There must be long-term economic
incentives in their minds. Regarding TNI, Mr. Hay did not
deny this point. As he commented, at the end of TNI's
activities, their companies should be more profitable;
however it is very slow and indirect. Though it is true that
the members of both partnership organizations would not
directly get profit from their activities in the
organizations, their companies will indirectly get
substantial profits from the goods and services sold to
people when the organization's projects achieve their goals
and the city succeeds in revitalizing its community and
economy. In this case, the bank, the finance company, and the
development corporation would get substantial profits from
investments which are attracted by the probable resurgence of
the local economy at an earlier time than other product-
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oriented companies. This is because first investments occur,
second, the economy gets active, and then the profits
produced are redistributed to the general public who purchase
products. Remember, for example, the Chairman of TNI is a
financier of a large savings & loan company; others, a
banker, developer, and so forth. I do not intend to blame
their hidden incentives but rather to define correctly their
positions. Therefore, the benefit of the participants is not
only the satisfaction of self-realization or philanthropy but
also indirect economic returns from the long-term perspective
for their corporations.
As far as its legal definition is concerned, the form of a
company limited by guarantee does not fit TNI's purpose
perfectly . Did local business leaders found TNI for any of
the "charitable" purposes? TNI's purpose is economic
revitalization and urban physical improvement through
redevelopment projects, of which 90% is commercial and 10% is
cultural, and the creation of cultural jobs. This purpose to
fall in 'other purposes beneficial to the community' and it
corresponds to public amenities, advancement of industry,
commerce, and craftsmanship, and mental and moral
improvement. But, to be precise, TNI's purpose overrides
them. In other words, TNI's purpose of economic
revitalization includes not purely "charitable" purposes. The
development projects of TNI would. create profit directly for
certain people, not the whole public, while they would have
some impacts in revitalizing the whole local economy.
Imp lications
When it comes to Kawasaki, local business leaders can hardly
accept the concept of "nonprofit" because there is no
tradition of corporate philanthropy. But the fact that
indirect, long-term economic return was a legitimate reason
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for the local business leaders of Newcastle and Lowell to
establish TNI and TLPI, respectively, has a positive impact
on motivating the business leaders of Kawasaki to form their
own nonprofit partnership organization. Because Japanese
business leaders have long used long-term perspectives for
their business management, they could adopt nonprofit"
organization's long term goals and objectives and the
responsibility entailed as members of such an organization.
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5. Style of action
TNI TLPI
--------------------------------------------
- Concentrating * Integrating
(District project-oriented, (City-wide marketing- and
aiming investments to the city) promotion-oriented, with
cultural,and educational
programs, as well as
housing, commercial, and
industrial projects)
- Strategic with region-wide Reactive with city-wide
view (Well prepared projects view (Provision of resources
and Lobbying the central to projects and programs
government for the provision of from the Board members and
infrastructure) direct involvement with the
City in city-wide
infrastructure improvement
projects)
----- ---------------------------------------------------
i Direct and swift
(Project implementation by
Taskforces and direct involve-
ment with local authorities in
planning and policy-making
affecting the districts focused
by TNI)
----- 
---------------------------------------------------
- Discretionary and less 
- Less discretionary and
accountable accountable
Though it relates to how long the partnership organization
has been in operation, the two organizations have several
different styles of action. First, TNI 's actions concentrate
on a couple of areas in downtown, while those of TLPI have a
wider context. TNI specified its roles as four schemes whose
focus is on two run-down downtown commercial areas. Though
focusing on downtown, TLPI draws its interest on a larger
geographical area with multiple fields of policy. In other
words, TNI's interest is primarily commercial development
while that of TLPI is the integration of commercial,
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industrial, residential, cultural, and educational
development.
Second, there is a difference in perspective. TNI shares a
region-wide perspective in economic development with regional
economic development organizations and the City as well,
while TLPI shares city-wide development policy and projects
primarily with the City. TNI's lobbying the legislators in
the Central government results from its region-wide
perspective. It is an important role for TNI to bring into
its region large scale projects. TNI was successful in
lobbying the Ministry of Transport for the construction of a
bypass in the western part of the city near the Theater
Village Project area. The bypass road will be extended from a
major expressway system planned by the Ministry as a national
project. 20 million pounds will be put into the bypass
project by the Ministry and the project will start in 1992.
TNI expects the project will create two thousand permanent
jobs within the region and have a positive impact on the
Theater Village Project. From its wide range of programs and
projects of TLPI, on the other hand, I infer that TLPI tends
to react to various problems as they come up on the agenda in
the Board meetings.
Third, TNI's decision-making and project implementation are
direct and swift; those of TLPI are not. TLPI has a
hierarchical structure as depicted in the structural chart in
a previous section, and, I speculate, has some fears that
Wang Laboratories Inc., a national corporation, would only
influence the decision-making. Wang Laboratories Inc. has
contributed much to economic improvements by locating its
world headquarters outside of downtown and its training
center in downtown. The LDFC, TLPI's collaborative financial
institution, has largely relied on the payback by Wang
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Laboratories of the UDAG. TNI, on the other hand, has a
simple decision-making process. Its constitution states that
if projects considered by the Board are agreed to by a simple
majority of the Board members, TNI adopts the projects, and
the Board members may set up Taskforces to bring about these
projects. Once the Taskforces are set up and carry out their
projects, they become self-governing autonomies separated
from the Board. This is suggested by the constitution, which
states that the Board will not have executive capacity.
Fourth, TNI includes a program to provide job and training
opportunities for underserved neighborhoods though these are
connected to the TNI's commercial projects only, while TLPI
does not have a similar one. With regard to real estate
redevelopment projects and business start-up projects, TLPI
focuses on those which promise to succeed and remain in the
city, excluding small, family operated business developments.
If they are high tech businesses, TLPI will welcome them
more. In this respect, TNI's style of action is more
philanthropic.
Fifth, the financial transactions of TLPI are more
accountable to interested citizens and other organizations
than those of TNI. This is because of the difference in the
availability of the financial support function between the
two organizations. Because TLPI raises funds and donations
city-wide, it must present reports and publicize to the
donors and fund providers what financial transactions are
made. This financial statement, which is informal and brief
helps any interested person understand what the emphases of
TLPI's activities are and how donations and funds are used.
This accountability is a side-effect of having a financial
support function and a nonprofit structure.
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Finally, both organizations seem to be similar, but there is
a difference in the degree of freedom for their members to
act according to their own judgement and do what seems right
or best. They are similar in that each seems to assume that
its members are allowed to have discretion in decision-making
because it is a nonprofit organization made by capable
leaders' goodwill and commitment to achieving public
benefits. Also, each represents primarily the business
community and the merchants in particular districts that
their projects focus on, but excludes direct citizen
participation. However, the availability of financing within
the organization emphasizes the difference in the degree of
discretion. TNI gives its member more discretion than TLPI.
This TNI's style of action reflects the English citizens'
tradition in public policy, which has been to rely upon the
capabilities and judgement of trusted administrators rather
than on a formal, or written, constitution. Pasty Healy calls
this the 'discretionary" tradition.26 The self-selected Board
members assume that they have the trust of the citizens of
Newcastle though they have not been elected through a formal
process to select them as representatives. TNI assumes that
the members of the Board represent the whole community and
are given discretionary power because they are individuals
with loyalty to the city, a strong sense of local identity,
leadership skills, and expertise, though they have
volunteered. TLPI, on the other hand, is less discretionary
to the extent that they can confirm how large a constituency
it has through receiving donations or funds to specific
projects and programs from individuals, corporations,
foundations, non-profit organizations, the State, and the
federal government.
Imp lications
The similar in the discretionary tradition between the
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Japanese and the English. In my view, the Japanese tend to
assume public administrators to be trustworthy enough to rely
on their capabilities, judgement, and morale. This does not
necessarily mean that the public prostrate itself before
them, yet it does mean that the public administrators are
always supposed to do good for the public without requests
from the public. As a result, Japanese public administrators
take responsibility to represent the public, yet in return
they hold too much pride that they are more capable than
ordinary residents and even the private sector people as
well. In such a society, the possibility of forming
partnerships between the public and private sectors would be
low. But the fact that TNI was established under a tradition
similar to Japan's would increase the possibility.
Another difference between both organization's styles of
action is meaningful for Kawasaki particularly for its
operation considering time horizon. TNI has concentrating and
strategic action with a region-wide view; TLPI has
integrating and reactive action with a city-wide view. This
difference reflects the maturity of organization. To continue
to act as a sustainable nonprofit organization, an early
success was essential for TNI when it was a new, start-up
organization. It is better for the new organization to focus
on a couple of particular areas to revitalize the local
economy rather than to disperse its resources to a wider
area. But it is indispensable for TNI to consider its focus
in a larger context and formulate its relation to region-wide
development policy. At an early stage of operation, TLPI had
a similar strategy: it focused on some real estate
development projects. After over ten years passed, TLPI now
has an integrated range of programs and projects, yet its
view is within the city. I speculate that the current task of
TLPI is to add further programs and projects to react to new
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demand occurring in the city.
IV. Other issues
1. Connection between.economic and cultural developments
Strategy for economic growth
TNI TLPI
-Building a better image 'Building a better image
-Physical improvement of 'Physical improvement of
commercial assets commercial and residential
assets
-Provision of job and training -Emphasis on marketing and
opportunities for under-served promotion campaigns and
neighborhoods events
'Support for start-up small
businesses in relation to the
projects that TNI proposes
-Economic and cultural property -Cultural and educational
development programs
'Efforts in attracting overseas
investment by providing basic
commercial services for
foreign employees
In my view, the most important strategy of both organizations
in common for inspiring investment to the city is to build a
better image of the city. But TNI and TLPI have different
elements in this strategy. TNI, on one hand, has two
elements: the link between economy and arts, culture, or the
entertainment industry, and information. The image-building
strategy necessitates not only improving physically run-down
areas in the city but stimulating arts and culture industry
as a major vehicle, Goddard points out, both to regenerate
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the local economy and to strengthen a sense of local identity
through improving the quality of life. TNI adopted this
strategy in West City Taskforce's "Theater Village"
development project. The Newcastle Publicity Taskforce has a
supporting role for image-building by informing the public
and other organizations of TNI's activities. The supply of
information is useful to get a constituency from the public
and other organizations. One of the reasons for using the
strategy is that Newcastle has basic resources for the
strategy in the form of facilities, activities, and
organizations. Beside theaters, cinemas, and galleries,
Newcastle has BBC and regional television, film production
companies, media training workshops, public studios, and
cable companies. To vitalize the arts and culture industry,
these institutions are working with the private sector:
Northern Arts, an regional arts promotion agency, Northern
Development Company, a union's industrial development
institution, and the University. Another reason for using
this strategy is that TNI regards the similar strategies of
Glasgow and Manchester as two cases of success. (However, if
rather macro definition of "success" is concerned, their
strategy has a problem.: the discrepancy in economic
performance between the North and the South has still
remained. For example, in 1990, the unemployment rate of
South East England is 3.8%, but that of Scotland Central
including Glasgow is 9.1%, Greater Manchester, 7.2% , and
Tyne and Wear including Newcastle, 10.4%.)27
TLPI, on the other hand, has been taking time to implement an
economic-cult-ural plan. It has created'a city office called
the Lowell Office of Cultural Affairs which is in charge of
the development of the link between economic development and
the enhancement of the community consisting of over fifty
ethnic groups. Before the creation of this office, TLPI
formed another team called the Lowell Cultural Plan which
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aimed at identifying cultural resources and social
characteristics and plan action programs for cultural
development. Beside this, TLPI implemented educational grant
programs to encourage individuals and educational
institutions
2. The role of academia
Academia is supporting TNI's efforts in regenerating the
local and the regional economy. As one of the members of TNI,
the University of Newcastle provides for the Board analytical
reports on regional economic characteristics and proposals
for urban redevelopment programs in specific areas, In my
view, academia is an indispensable partner for the business
leaders of TNI in making a practical and efficient overall
plan for the whole community through paying attention to it
from various perspectives. I have not been able to study the
role of TLPI's members from the academic community, but I
expect that it would be almost the same as that of TNI.
VI. Alternative organizations
To discuss this issue, it is useful to use the types of
association, to see which categories of organization TNI and
TLPI fall into and what optional types of organization there
are. Focusing on activity, Gamwell proposed five categories. 2 8
As Diagram 1 shows, he divides associations into
governmental" and "nongovernmental." The latter consists of
"private-regarding" and "public-regarding" which is divided
into "less inclusive", "more inclusive and nonpolitical-
regarding", and "more inclusive and political-regarding."
An alternative organization for TNI and TLPI is a more
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inclusive. one. It is one that has input from the public. The
activities of TNI and TLPI fall into the "public regarding",
but I cannot identify them as "more inclusive,.' With respect
to the difference between them in the democratic
representation of constituency, TNI falls on the left hand
side of the "less inclusive", and TLPI falls on the right
hand side near the "more inclusive and nonpolitical
regarding.,"
Diagram 1. Categories of organization
----- ----------------------------------------------------
Governmental Nongovernmental
~~ T------------------------------
private- Public-regarding
regarding ----------------
Less More
inclusive inclusive
TNI TLPI Non-
political- Political-
regarding regarding
It would be appropriate for the private sector to promote a
city vision and public interest when the public sector itself
cannot revitalize the regional economy. But, in my view, both
partnerships have a problem of democratic representation of
the public interest. I appreciate that TNI marked a
significant transformation of the norm of the private sector,
which has long been outside of the tradition of philanthropy
in England. The members are working very sincerely in order
to realize the city's vision for the community as if they
were working as trusted administrators because they are
motivated to devote themselves to a desirable evolution of
the city. It seems to me very impressive because the business
community usually takes profit driven activities over public
interest. Also I appreciate TLPI in that it has been
contributing to the city's regeneration for over ten years
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through collaboration with the private sector and fund-
raising from various groups, which is an indirect measure of
the breadth of support within the community. However, I argue
that the perspective of the business community in both
partnerships presupposes that the general public understands
and trusts their intentions to contribute to public benefit
without participation in decision-making. This makes me
categorize both partnerships as "less inclusive" in Gamwell's
model.
There is little room to argue that government, including the
City, or other local authorities, will fill the TNI's and
TLPI's places. How about central or federal and regional
governments? In the British context, it is unlikely to think
that central government with its constituency mainly in the
South could support a drastic restructuring of the British
economic landscape. In the American context, it is unlikely
that the federal government will intervene in local economic
issues. Regional governments, county or state level in both
contexts, and the City are expected to have ability that the
central or the federal government cannot afford. But they
cannot fill the TNI's and TLPI's places because they have to
represent multiple constituencies, each of whose interests
confront one another. Regional and city governments, at
least, tend to be cautious when approaching the private
sector. How about regional development agencies, such as
Urban Development Corporations in the U.K.? They are
certainly not appropriate to redevelop the city simply
because their aim is for regional industrial development
initiated by the Central Government. They are primarily a
part of the central government. There are some differences
between the British and the American political contexts, but
I speculate that government often lacks the ability to
organize efficiently other public, or quasi-public
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organizations, and the private sector influences local
economic development. The reasons for this would be that
government has neither a close link with local leaders in
various groups, nor sufficient funds nor financial expertise.
An alternative is a for-profit partnership of private
companies, or "private-regarding" organizations on Gamwell's
map. It could be successful, but not to the extent that TNI
or TLPI have been. It could achieve part of TNI's or TLPI's
goals particularly with the property-oriented development
projects that TNI or TLPI are implementing. Yet the
organization's incentives for the projects would be weak
because it needs more time and money to satisfy the level of
quality that public interest requires than if it starts
projects only for their profit. Such a partnership also has
difficulty gaining financial or administrative support from
the public sector on its projects and programs. This lack of
support from the public sector makes the private partnership
organization lose incentives for carrying projects and
programs aimed at the public benefit. From the perspective of
democratic representation of pluralist communities, the
private for-profit partnership has more difficulty gaining
support from the general public than TNI and TLPI have.
Scarce public support does not motivate the public sector to
participate in collaborative work with the private sector. In
conclusion, the only alternative organization is one which is
more inclusive than TNI and TLPI, or one which provides
residents and the public sector with an opportunity to
participate in decision-making.
In this chapter, I have discussed the problems of existing
partnerships including for-profit partnership organizations
and preliminary private partnership organizations in Kawasaki
and concluded that they are not suitable or sufficient for
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the redevelopment of Southeastern Kawasaki. I also discussed
Japanese third sector organizations and argued that they do
not adequately represent public benefits. If Southeastern
Kawasaki is redeveloped by an organization which does not
produce public goods or does not represent the public
interest, the area's current unpleasant urban environment
will deteriorate further. In this respect, if a public-
private partnership is desirable for such an area, a
partnership similar to both TNI and TLPI will has to be the
model. But the questions what will make the model happen and
how will it fit into the area are a different discussion,
which I will discuss later.
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Chapter 5. A model, its applicability, and the factors
to make it happen
In the last chapter I compared TNI and TLPI as model
organizations, discussed the implications of this comparison,
and examined their applicability to Kawasaki. I then proposed
the concept of a two-step dynamic mode as an public-private
partnership organization suitable for Kawasaki. In this
chapter I complete structuring the model to respond to the
socio-politico context of Kawasaki where large national
corporations dominate the local economy and land ownership.
I. Two-phase dynamic model
In the last chapter, I articulated a two-phase model for the
current situation of Kawasaki, the major differences between
the two phases, being:
-In the first phase, the partnership organization's role
would be to build redevelopment policy, while that of the
second phase would be to make concrete projects and implement
them through extensive discussions among as many communities
as possible;
-In the first phase, the organization would be primarily
private sector oriented, while in the second phase, the
public sector would be involved more in decision making; and
-In the first phase, the citizens role would be limited only
to be advisory, while in the second, it would be extended to
the decision-making process.
But still, the structure of the western models that allow
members to have mutual authority is not applicable to
Southeastern Kawasaki where large national corporations
dominate the local economy and a few of them also dominate
land ownership.
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To mitigate the overpowering influence by dominant
corporations, some modifications will be made by referring to
the structure of the Ohta-ward Urban Development Corporation
introduced in Chapter 2. The lessons learned from the power
balancing structure of the OUDC are 1:
-The powers of large corporations and small local businesses
will be balanced by the membership if CEOs represent the
local companies and middle class managers represent the large
corporations, if they had been CEO's, they would have
overpowered the others;
-The arbitrators will maintain the balance of power between
the large and the small; and
-A skillful developer from the outside of the local community
will be helpful to harmonize members.
Fig.1
Executive Meeting
KCEO
LDeputy CEO
Chief Secretaries
-- Staff Meeting
Chairmen's
Committee
Project Study Project Study Project Study
Group Meeting 1 Group Meeting 2 Group Meeting 3
The structure of the OUDC suggests how subtle it is in Japan
to form an organization among so many different interests.
The Ohta-ward Branch Office of Tokyo Chamber of Commerce &
Industry formalized, as depicted by Fig.1, the OUDC's
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hierarchy in which four Project Study Group Meetings
subordinate to Executive Meeting held by Chief Secretaries, a
Deputy CEO, and a CEO. Each Project Study Group has one
chairman. The Chairmen's Committee and Staff Meeting are
placed between Project Study Group Meetings and Executive
Meeting. Each Project Study Group Meeting is a forum for four
member companies to address and claim their interests. The
Executive Meeting was in charge of the appointment of new
members and the operation of the whole organization. The
Staff Meeting was held by representative companies from the
OBO/CCI. Contrary to the apparent theory of this structure,
Fig.1. does not reflect an actual relationship among member
companies. The actual relationship is depicted in Fig.2.
Fig.2
Executive Meeting Staff Meeting
CEO (1) Large Corporations (5)/
Dep. CEO (2) Chief Secretaries (4)
Chief Secretaries (14) from Executive Meeting
The group of
small local
'businesses
Fin OBO/CCI
The group of
large corp's
in OBO/CCI
The group of Chairmen _
(Arbitrator)
Project Study VProject Study Project Study
Group Meeting 1 Group Meeting 2 Group Meeting 3
Owners from a segment of
small, local businesses
(Arbitrator)
Middle class managers
from a segment of
large corporations
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II
Power is balanced between members on the Staff Meeting and
the Project Teams. The formal structure designated that the
Staff Meeting's function was to advise the Executives, who
included twenty founder companies of the OUDC, primarily
local small businesses. They provided the Executives with
real estate developmen'tal expertise, such as designing,
financial study, and political advising. But I infer from
Fig.2, they had as much influence on other decisions as the
Executive Meeting had. The Staff consisted of a group of
representative local companies and a group of large
corporations including two general contractors, one
developer, one aviation company, and four representatives of
OBO/CCI. The two general contractors were the largest of
their kind in Japan and had been influencing Ohta-ward
economically and politically. The developer, the largest in
Japan, owned the largest amount of land in urban Tokyo,
including the ward. The aviation company was the owner of the
vacant land to be created by the Airport expansion plan. In
the Staff Meeting, power was balanced by the way that CEOs
represented the local companies and middle class managers
represented the large corporations, which would have
overpowered the small local companies if they had been CEO's.
Every large corporation and local company in the Staff
Meeting had another seat in each of four Project Study Group
Meeting, which consisted of twenty to fifty members, so that
the dominant large companies and powerless local companies
were able to influence the work of the organization. Each
Project Study Group Meeting consisted of a group of local
companies and a group of large corporations. Except for the
members of the Staff Meeting, the members of both groups in
the Project Study Group Meeting had only one seat. Between
the two groups in the Project Study Group Meetings, there
might be disputes. It necessitated four Chairmen, the
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arbitrators, to coordinate respectively one of four Project
Study Groups. Compared to the Staff members, each of four
Chairmen was relatively neutral except for one developer who
was also one of the Staff Meeting members. Peculiar is the
presence of the largest developer both as an arbitrator in a
Project Study Group and as a member of the Staff Meeting.
Probably, the OUDC depended on the developer to orchestrate
member's different opinions and form a consensus which led to
smooth decision-making.
Therefore, three characteristics are instructive for my
model. First, the OUDC's membership considers social status
determined between the position of a member within a company
and the size of the member's company. Second, the arbitrators
will maintain the balance of power between the large and the
small. Finally, a skillful developer from the outside of the
local community will be a key to harmonize members.
For the modification of my model, I employ these lessons. But
these are applicable only to the first phase, because I
assume that in the second phase top executives's leadership
and corporate citizenship are sufficient to balance power and
orchestrate different interests. As is clear in the previous
chapter, TNI is applicable to current Kawasaki as a base
structure. But I designate the Advisory Group for the first
phase including governments and residents so that the model
fits better.
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II. Mechanism of resident participation
The model modified in the last section is illustrated below.
(First phase)
Board of Directors (20)--------paid by their own
organizations
Bi-monthly meetings
-To make efforts in bring about public benefit within the
scope of its goal and objectives
-To make strategic decisions affecting the city's future
development.
-To provide leadership and expertise necessary to the
development projects
-To discuss general schemes on revitalization, narrow them
down to specific issues, and identify particular economic,
cultural, social, and educational revitalization projects
-To set up teams for the projects
-When agreed by a single majority of the Board member, a
specific project is formally adopted by the Board for.
promotion: then, a project team will be created.
Chairman (1) from a private corporation
----- with the right to vote
Senior members ----- with the right to vote
Private corporations
Financial institutions
Media
Developers
Other industries, etc.
Academia
Leadership skills
Expertise
Executive Director's Office
-- paid by their own organizations
-General administration
Executive Director, Assistant
Directors, and staff
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Conceptual redevelopment project proposal for the city
Advisory Group
Quart ery forum with Invited members without the right to vote
The City
-Regional government
i-Chamber of Commerce & Industry
-Central government or its agencies
K-Representatives from resident's groups
Interim redevelopment policy proposal
After several to ten years, the first phase model transforms
to a more democratic organization:
(Second phase)
Taskforces ofTaskforces of
District 1,2,...
Monthly Meetings
-Discussion
-Modification of the interim
redevelopment policy proposal
'-Planning
Final Project proposal
!'Private landowners
real estate corporations
manufacturers
retailers and wholesaler
other private corporatio
Ownership small companie
-Individual landowners
Public landowners
the City
public organizations
Non-landowner private- compan
-Chamber of Commerce & Indust
Resident's organizations
s
ns
s
ie
ry
Input
Special Interest
Public Groups for
District 1, 2,
Monthly Meetings
-Discussion
-The City departments
-The Prefecture
-Public organizations
-Resident' s
organizations
-Individual activists
s
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I
Technical Ass Iistant 
Teams Supr
-Technical assistance
Planners from the public sector and the
private sector
Executive Director's Office paid by their own organizations,
-Financial assistance
-Market study, promotion programs
-Land ownership management
Executive Director, Assistant Directors,
and staff from the dominant corporate landowner
and the City
Board of directors
Quartery Board Meeting
-Approval or refusal of projects proposed by the District
Taskforces
-Appointment and resignation decision
-Lobbying to the Central Government
I-Chairman elected from the landowner private
corporation members in industry
Representatives from the landowner private
corporations in each District Taskforce
Representatives from district private shop owners
organization
The City representative
The Prefectural Government representative
The Central Government Agency representative
The Resident's representative
Project Teaml
-Project implementation
A variety of combinations of members
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In the first phase, resident participation is minimal
because, in my view, it is too early to put unpoliticized and
uninstitutionalized residents into discussions among private
corporations. They could not represent the public interest at
a table on which nothing is placed. But they can point out
what is not appropriate on materialized policy in front of
them. In this phase the partnership organization will have to
appoint and invite representatives from residents. In the
meantime, residents will be mobilized and make their own
activities, such as community meetings. In the second phase
in which residents' activities reach a high voltage,
resident's representatives will participate in discussions
with government, through the Special Interest Public Groups,
to make input regarding public benefits to specific district
forums and the Taskforces for Districts, which are primarily
led by the private sector, The Taskforces for Districts
modify the interim redevelopment policy proposal made by the
first phase organization, and make concrete project
proposals. The Board of Directors, including top
representatives of every sector, make final decisions on the
proposals. Then set up the Project Teams to implement the
projects.
III. Actors, causes, trends, timing, and incentives to make
the model happen
My analysis up to this point is missing an analysis of what
will make my model come about. The study of my model's
applicability to Kawasaki in the last section presupposed
that the model already exists. So did the structural
modification of the model. In Chapter 2, I predicted the
future of Kawasaki which I later modified later defending on
the point of deindustrialization in particular. But the
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modified prediction by itself did not discuss convincingly
what will make a new public-private partnership organization
happen.
In this coming decade Kawasaki will experience negative
impacts for the whole community with an economic decline
which will be caused by the decline of the quality in human
resources. With inter-connected different interests, the
whole community, including the manufacturing industries, the
City, residents, and academia, will need my model partnership
organization for the redevelopment for Southeastern Kawasaki.
A major threat for the manufacturing industries in
Southeastern Kawasaki is the decline of the quality in human
resources. This will induce the industries to improve the
area's environment, one of the most unpleasant urban
environments in Japan. The industries have inter-related
circumstances which will further affect the labor quality:
the unpleasant urban environment, a bad image of the city,
aging population of the native Japanese, immigrating
foreigners for jobs, and the developing countries' pressure
in economic competition on conventional materials and
machines. To attract human resources with better quality, the
industries will seek to have a better environment around
their locus, but the environmental improvement is not a task
for a company alone. The City will face the need for
sufficient revenue for elderly social welfare. To secure tax
revenue, it will need more residents and healthy industries.
To locate them in Southeastern Kawasaki, it will have to
improve the environment of Southeastern Kawasaki. Residents
will be politicize by immigration and public policy in land
management and housing. To participate in the process of the
redevelopment of their places, they will find a good
opportunity in the partnership organization set up for the
redevelopment. Academia has a supportive role to the above
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three sectors. It should supply them more information on
successful western partnerships and their applicability to
Kawasaki than my thesis. Above all, the most important actor
is a largest land owner corporation. It should recognize its
corporate responsibility to improve the environment of the
area and take lead to form the partnership organization. In
my view, the 90s would be an appropriate time to set up a
partnership representing as many different interests as
possible and to promote desirable changes in the urban
environment.
The city's key manufacturing industries,'consisting of
steelmaking and petro-chemicals, were major participants in
the Japanese industrialization during the post war period.
Depending on massive, small and mid-sized industrial
companies with disadvantageous employment conditions, the
industrialization created one of the most unpleasant urban
environment in Southeastern Kawasaki, including polluted
river and air quality, the lack of parks, cultural
facilities, and advanced educational resources, and low
quality housing. These caused to label Kawasaki as a
devastated environment. Though a short-term slowdown in its
growth was predicted in Kawasaki two decades ago, the
industries were able to avoid a major damage primarily
because of small and mid-sized companies' ability to respond
technological innovation and their labor's flexibility to
change occupation.
More recently, Kawasaki has begun to experience the
restructure of the manufacturing industries with the threat
of de-industrialization. Some of large corporations have been
diversifying into high-tech fields, trying to change their
focus from conventional goods by mass production to high
value added ones by lean production. Some have been
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strengthening R&D. The rest have moved out their production
overseas or just declined. A major cause of these trends seem
to be that since the early 1980s, developing countries have
become competitive with conventional industrial materials and
heavy machines, such as steel and tankers.
Yet, recently, the industries have turned out to be facing
more serious problem, the decline of quality in human
resources. Able human resources include skillful labor with
the ability to absorb technological innovation with
motivation to participate in the part of management,
entrepreneurial managers with ability to make strategic
business policy with expertise and sensitivity to better work
conditions for labor, and practical professionals with
advanced knowledge in their specialties and sufficient
experiences in general. It is caused and will be deteriorated
by an inter-relationship among the unpleasant urban
environment,. aging population, immigration, unpopularity of
the manufacturing industries as the occupation of young
people. Since the post war industrialization, the unpleasant
environment has imprinted a bad image of the city on the mind
of younger generations, and this causes the youths to
alienate from the manufacturing industries located in and
characterized by the unpleasant environment of Southern
Kawasaki. Whether the industries diversify into new fields or
innovate their existing goods, they need to improve and
maintain the quality of human resources unless they leave
the area. It is very likely that the quest for the better
quality of human resources converges with the need for
environmental improvement. To attract human resources with
high quality, the restructuring industries will have to
search for the solution and will find it the most effective
to improve the unpleasant environment of Southeastern
Kawasaki creating the bad image for the city as a whole which
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is causing the degrade of human resources' quality.
There an unavoidable event and an impetus which will turn the
industries to the movement toward environmental improvement
for the whole community. The restructure of the industries is
creating redevelopment opportunities. The diversification and
technological innovation are creating massive idle land in
factory sites, shrinking the need of space for the production
of conventional goods. This redevelopment opportunities will
match the movement toward environmental improvement. The
profit-oriented redevelopment of private interest will be
stimulated by a national project of expressways, which run
into Kawasaki, to be completed in less than a decade. The
project will have a tremendous negative impact on the
environment of Southeastern Kawasaki and increase the need
for preventing the environment from devastating. It is likely
that the corporations owning re-developable, idle land link
their private profits to be generated by the redevelopment of
their land with a broader environmental improvement as a
strategy to get able human resources attracted to the area
and the industries. But it is not a task of a company alone.
A partnership among various sectors is one of the best tools
for the interest of the industries.
I speculate that the public sector and residents, or
individuals, in Kawasaki are already expressing the causes,
trends, and incentives which will lead them to form a public-
private partnership with the private sector over the long
term. What they share is an unpleasant environment, including
a deteriorated physical setting in Southeastern Kawasaki and
city-wide high land prices'which are continuously climbing
up.
I expect that the City can stimulate the industries to begin
1 32
to assure more corporate responsibility. The City has obvious
reasons to attempt collaboration with the industries in the
redevelopment of Southern Kawasaki. From a recent time,
governments in Japan have been warning that the trend of the
aging population will gradually increase pressure on their
budgets for social welfare within fifteen years. Recognizing
this, the City, the Pfefecture, and the Central Government
will certainly increase individual's tax burden over the
years. Currently, its main revenues from the city area depend
on high corporate tax rates imposed on industries in
Southeastern Kawasaki and relatively low property tax on both
industries and households in the Northwest. But to increase
revenues, it will have to either have southeastern industries
in good shape or increase the number of southeastern
residents who are able to pay increasing taxes. The City will
not be able to develop the northern region as residential
area, because the region is almost fully developed and has a
large number of residents. Because re-developable land for
residential use is Southern Kawasaki, its unpleasant urban
environment is and will be a.major obstacle against
attracting new businesses, high quality human resources, and
residents. The City will have to improve the area's
environment. There is an impetus urging the City. National
highway projects are coming soon with capitalistic
developers, unwelcome, enormous traffic volume. Setting their
bases in Kawasaki, some developers are ready to go; one of
them has formed a partnership of private companies. In these
conditions, the City will have significant incentives to form
a partnership to redevelop the area because the organization
can achieve public benefits, and reduce the City's financial
burden.
There are contingencies, but they will never discourage the
City to form the partnership organization. If the City, the
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Prefecture, and the Central Government fail to implement new
taxation to make social welfare programs work, the City will
ultimately want more seriously to form a partnership
organization with the private sector. It is unlikely that the
governments can raise taxes without opposition from the
public. If massive immigration happens in Southeastern
Kawasaki and degrade housing conditions in the area, the City
will want the organization even more seriously.
The resident participation in the partnership organization is
needed because they are important land owners and the change
of environment always affects them the most severely. I admit
that it is difficult to make apolitical individuals
amalgamate politically within a corporatist society, but I
speculate that currently, there are some factors to
politicize and make them have interest in a partnership
organization. The factors are the effect of immigration and
the failure of public policy. If the Central Government eases
legally restrictions on immigration and job opportunities for
foreigners, a massive immigration will happen in Southern
Kawasaki and will deteriorate housing condition of the
community. This would stimulate the area's residents
politically and they would seek chance to participate in the
process of the redevelopment of their places. They would
identify the establishment of the partnership organization as
the best opportunity. If governments fail to implement land
price controls or a housing policy to enable younger people
to obtain housing units at reasonable prices, resident
activists will stand up under the higher income taxes needed
for elderly social welfare. They will have to
institutionalize with other residents to create organizations
which can coordinate fragmented interests of the residents
and present public-benefit-regarding opinions. These are
likely to happen and have enough impacts on residents' lives
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to make them politicize and turn to the partnership
organization.
The academic community has a supportive role in supplying
information to the City, the private sector, and resident
organizations. It should formulate current problems of the
Japanese third sector organizations in development and study
more western partnerships. Historically, Japanese academia in
city planning has been only a derivative field of science or
engineering from architecture and civil engineering. Its
focus has been on urban development engineering only because
such a focus is useful primarily for economic development
which is one of the major objectives of a corporatist
society. The scope of the academia is the reflection of the
nature of the Japanese society. I do not discuss this issue
more because the transformation the nature of the academia in
city planning would be the next frontier for me.
I discussed four sectors as actors forming the partnership
organization. However, the most important actor in my
scenario for the establishment of my model partnership
organization in Kawasaki is NKK Corporation. I expect that in
a few years it will come to realize its responsibility to
improve the area physically, economically, and socially. It
is one of the largest steelmaking and heavy engineering
companies and the largest landowner in Southern Kawasaki. It
owns 48% of the area, using their land primarily for several
industrial facilities, employees' apartments, and its
hospital which serves the entire city. From my interviews, I
discovered that the City placed great importance on the
movement of NKK. An official.speculated that the future of
the area would be up to the industries, assuming that no
other companies would not take action unless NKK would do.
But the industries has already taken actions: it started to
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diversify into high-tech industries several years ago; it has
decided that it will stop the operation of its iron furnaces
in ten years, when national highway projects near its factory
sites will already have been completed; and it developed some
of its vacant land for expensive apartments. To take lead in
the redevelopment of Southern Kawasaki, the industries should
understand that environmental improvement is urgent to secure
its economic position by attracting high quality labor and
maintain the health of the local economy. But the industries
has a problem. Aiming at profit only, it has started to plan
with a developer and local businesses large, district
redevelopment, Kokan Street Redevelopment. The leaders of the
industries should be more aware of the changing circumstances
in the area particularly with respect to these points.
Though the size of companies would lead to different
scenarios, the industries of Southern Kawasaki have to
redevelop and improve the area in a concerted manner with
the City and the residents. Competitive foreign companies
with cheap costs of production are threatening
manufacturers, whether they are large or small, in
Southeastern Kawasaki. Perhaps, Southeastern Kawasaki will
deindustrialize very slowly. For the coming decade, the
trend that young people are away from the manufacturing
industries will continue to hit the industries. Because of
this, local small and middle-sized industrial companies,
which have been competitive, will lose their cutting edge.
Large corporations will be directly hit by the trend and
directly by the decline of the small and mid-sized
companies. As a result, the manufacturing industries as a
whole will seriously need high quality, human resources and
will feel the need for environmental improvement to attract
them. In less than several years, they will know that
environmental improvement is urgent. But it is not a job
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for a company alone. They will turn to the City and
residents.
The company can take various actions to stimulate and
cooperate the City, such as supplying information on the
success of western partnerships, asking it for financial
incentives, and coordinating with it forums and symposia
among other private corporations, small businesses, the
residents. To form the partnership with other actors, the
company should first stimulate the City.
The City, on the one hand, has an indispensable role of
stimulating the public and the private sector politically. It
can legitimize direct resident participation in the process
of redevelopment projects. The policy failure discussed would
cause a negative institutionalization of residents.
But it is not suitable for the model partnership organization
to include residents who have negative perspectives to the
City and itself. In this respect, the City should avoid the
institutionalization of residents based on negative
perspectives. To avoid this, the City should legitimize
direct residents participation in redevelopment process. The
City also stimulate NKK corporation to transform into a good
corporate citizen. It can do what I recommended to the
company.
There would be an additional actions for attracting private
firms and individuals to the partnership organization. First,
if the organization is allowed to distribute low rates of
return to donors, or investors, those who are interested in
the partnership, yet want to minimize losses of what they
invest, would participate.
In the long term, Kawasaki will experience socio-economic
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changes as I predicted, but if proposed actions for the four
sectors do not happen, my model public-private partnership
organization will never happen and the urban environment of
Southern Kawasaki, including socio-political situations, will
never be improved. The restructuring manufacturing industries
should take the lead for the private sector with
understanding their corporate responsibility in the area.
Among these industries, NKK corporation is the key. The City
should stimulate the company, other private firms, and
residents. Academia should contribute to their collaboration.
It is not until the four sector's actions converge at a
certain time that Southern Kawasaki will experience the birth
of a public-private partnership organization and the
improvement its urban environment. In my view, the 90s would
be an appropriate time to set up a partnership representing
as many different interests as possible and to promote
desirable changes in the urban environment.
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Chapter 6. Conclusion
My argument for the possibility of forming a new public-
private partnership organization in Kawasaki is based on a
comparison of economic history among Kawasaki, Newcastle, and
Lowell. The manufacturing industries of Kawasaki, especially
small and middle-sized local companies, have enough
technology to survive, unlike their counterparts in Newcastle
and Lowell in the past. Beside my prediction that Kawasaki
will face future economic, environmental, and social
problems, such as: deindustrialization; aging population;
negative impact of national projects; and immigration, the
interviews provided me with some negative information on the
possibility of Kawasaki forming a new partnership. This
information includes political confusion and fragmentation
among governments at different levels, real local autonomy,
the dominance of large corporations in the local economy and
in land ownership, political and economic centralism, scarce
corporate citizenship, poor record of citizenship, and scarce
leadership in both the private and the public sector. But I
speculate that the local government, restructuring
industries, and citizens will need a long term, new
partnership for urban redevelopment in Southern Kawasaki.
Certain needs for realizing public benefits will converge:
(1) industries will have to restructure themselves in an
attempt to improve the image of the city and to attract a
capable labor force; (2) residents will have to improve
housing and living conditions, strengthen local confidence,
and recognize diversifying ethnicity in the community; and
(3) the local government will need to raise revenue to meet
the needs of social welfare especially for the elderly. The
manufacturing industries of Southeastern Kawasaki will have
to improve the local environment to attract high quality
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labor, and avoid deindustrialization. I modified my original
prediction to some extent but articulated that
deindustrialization is not avoidable and the manufacturing
industries of Southeastern Kawasaki will have to improve the
local environment to attract high quality labor.
I see TNI as an efficient pro-development small government.
TNI benefits private corporations, though, Mr Hay stressed,
the Board members never pursue a direct personal or corporate
benefit. TNI is registered as a company limited by guarantee,
which means that the members may not distribute profit among
them. TLPI is a non-profit private corporation whose goal,
according to a catalogue published by TLPI in 1979, is " to
make Lowell the best, most livable mid-size city in America."
As time passes by, TLPI's function has changed from a
planning and policy making body acting through property
developers to a marketing and promotion force. TLPI has used
its nonprofit structure to attract resources including
charitable donations, grants, and bequests. The local
business leaders of Southern Kawasaki can hardly accept the
concept of "nonprofit' because there is no tradition of
corporate philanthropy in Japan. But the fact that indirect,
long-term economic return was a legitimate reason for the
local business leaders of Newcastle and Lowell to establish
TNI and TLPI, respectively, would have a positive impact on
motivating the business leaders of Kawasaki to form a
nonprofit partnership organization.
I employed Til's models which highlights the dominant
relationships among major entities, including government,
private corporations, nonprofit sector, and the citizens in
many countries. Kawasaki falls into the corporatist society,
Lowell, or middle-size American cities, falls into the
pluralist model. Newcastle, or middle size British cities,
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fall somewhere in between the two. My model suggested that
Kawasaki will confront difficulties in dealing with the socio-
political characteristics of Kawasaki. The TNI's evolution
process suggest that there is a small possibility for the
establishment of a new partnership organization for Kawasaki
if everything in Kawasaki is unchanged. I found that the
goals of a partnership development organization are generic
though their objectives reflect specific local economic
circumstances. I proposed appropriate goals and objectives
for a model organization for Kawasaki. It is unlikely for a
Japanese organization to include a financing function based
on donations because there is no tradition of donations.
Individual and corporate citizenship will also be critical
factors for the establishment of the partnership organization
because they are the major, sources of leadership and
philanthropic activities. There is the scarcity of human
resources of top business executives who have invested so
much capital in their city and devoted their own lives so
much to their own business based there that they can never
abandon them.
The exclusion of resident participation is not suitable for
an area where residents are seriously underserved in terms of
the political representation of their interests. I suggested
that an alternative organization for TNI and TLPI should be a
more inclusive one by referring to Gamwell's map for
organization types. I modified western models to fit Kawasaki
and proposed a two-phase dynamic model. In the first phase,
the partnership organization's role would be to build
redevelopment policy, the organization would be primarily
private sector oriented, and the residents' role would be
limited only to be advisory. In the second phase, the
partnership organization's role would be to make concrete
projects and implement them through extensive discussions
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among as many communities as possible, the public sector
would be involved more in decision making, and the residents'
role would be extended to decision-making process. To balance
power among companies within the model organization, I used
the lessons learnt from the power balancing structure of the
OUDC. The powers of large corporations and small local
businesses will be balanced among the membership if CEOs
represent the local companies and middle class managers
represent the large corporations, which would have
overpowered the others if they had been CEO's. The
arbitrators will maintain the balance of power between the
large and the small. A skillful developer from the outside of
the local community will be helpful to harmonize members.
In this coming decade Kawasaki will experience negative
impacts for the whole community with an economic decline
which will be caused by the decline of the quality in human
resources. With inter-connected different interests, the
whole community, including the manufacturing industries, the
City, residents, and academia, will need a new partnership
organization like my model for the redevelopment for
Southeastern Kawasaki. The quality in human resources will
induce the industries to improve the area's environment.
There are inter-related circumstances which will further
affect the labor quality: the unpleasant urban environment, a
bad image of the city, aging population of the native
Japanese, immigrating foreigners for jobs, and the developing
countries' increasing economic competitiveness. To attract
human resources with better quality, the industries will seek
to have a better environment around their locus, but the
environmental improvement is not a task for a company alone.
The City will face the need for sufficient revenue for
elderly social welfare. To secure tax revenue, it will need
more residents and healthy industries. To locate them in
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Southeastern Kawasaki, it will have to improve the
environment of Southeastern Kawasaki. Residents will be
politicize by immigration and public policy in land
management and housing, To participate in the process of the
redevelopment of their places, they will find a good
opportunity in the establishment of the partnership
organization set up for the redevelopment. Academia has a
supportive role to the above three sectors. It should supply
them more information on successful western partnerships and
their applicability to Kawasaki than my thesis. Above all,
the most important actor is a largest land owner corporation.
It should recognize its corporate responsibility to improve
the environment of the area and take lead to form the
partnership organization. To promote desirable changes in the
urban environment, the 90s would be an appropriate time to
set up a partnership organization representing as many
different interests as possible, based on many attributes of
western partnerships,
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MAP 2. Development around Tokyo Bay-
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Photo 1. Waterfront of Southeastern Kawasaki
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Appendix A.
"Charitable" purpose
To define "charitable" purposes, Michael Chesterman classifys
"charity" and then describes how the primitive concept of
charity has been transformed to a highly sophisticated social
term which is associated with a legal definition. The most
primitive form of charity is the giving of alms or hand-outs
to a beggar. "Charity" is a deep-rooted element in human
behavior but is not free from moral ambiguity. As it was
regarded as a Christian duty in medieval times, motivation
for charity activities tended to be based on the rewards for
fulfillment and the damnation for neglect. When broadening
its meaning to a social relevance as a contribution to
general welfare, we call it "philanthropy." Philanthropic
purposes needed some institutional structure when the scale
of costs and objectives became larger. In modern times, the
state has become interested in social welfare on a national
scale by encouraging philanthropic, or charitable,
institutions and recognizing for them the necessity of legal
protection and regulations. British charity law categorizes
charitable purposes into these five: (i) relief of poverty,
(ii) advancement of education, (iii) advancement of religion,
(iv) other purposes beneficial to the community which the law
recognizes as charitable, and (v) recreational purposes. For
a clearer definition of the fourth category, its breakdown is
listed below.
(a) relief of aged
(b) relief of the sick and disabled.
(c) social rehabilitation, such as orphanages and homes for
children delinquent or lacking parental supervision.
(d) distress resulting from air raids, disasters, etc.
(e) protection of life, limb, and property, by the .
establishment maintenance of a fire brigade or life boat
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Legal Terms
service, or by the promotion of road safety.
(f) protecting and upholding the nation and its established
political structures including, for example, the defence of
the realm, maintenance of armed forces, admiration of the
public toward the armed forces, and independence of the
judiciary.
(g) gifts for the benefit of a locality
(h) public amenities including the repair of bridges, ports,
and highways, the preservation of the countryside and the
country's architectural heritage, and the establishment of
public facilities
(i) advancement of industry, commerce, agriculture,
horticulture, and craftsmanship
(j) mental and moral improvement
(k) animal welfare
In addition, the purposes of a charitable institution must
contain an element of public benefit and are not disqualified
even if they involve profit-making and are highly political.
With the word "charitable," 'a company limited by guarantee'
seems to have some hints showing how the founders of TNT
desired to make TNT work when they founded it, but these are
unfamiliar words for me, even in the American legal
literature.
A company limited by guarantee
This institutional form is, in short, a company which the law
prohibits from distributing profits among its members but
protects them by limiting personal liability when the company
becomes insolvent. To set up the company and register it
legally, the founder needs to pay £50 and prepare a
constitution stating its objectives, powers, and internal
regulations on meeting proceedings, membership admission, and
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election of management board members.
This form derives from the trust, a institutional form used
for charitable purposes. The trust is a relationship which
imposes personal duties on specific individuals (the
trustees), and then extends these so as to confer on the
beneficiaries a quasi-proprietary interest in the trust
property held on their behalf. The trust suites
individualistic character of philanthropy that donors, for
example, often put specific desires on how trustees conduct
the donated property. From the Tudor to the present day, the
"trust" has been the legal form most closely associated with
institutional philanthropy. Originally, the feudal landowners
developed the trust because they desired to evade a form of
taxation imposed by the common law on the transmission of
land to their heirs. The landowners, called "donors or
testators, " transferred their land to trustees to hold for
the use of their heirs, beneficiaries.
The trust form fails in two respects to meet the demands
which philanthropy may put upon it. First, the trust
presupposes that it is enforced by its beneficiaries while
philanthropists commonly do not indicate who are the
beneficiaries and beneficiaries are politically in a weak
position to enforce the trust due to their poverty. Second,
the trust form is not suitable for charitable activity
undertaken collectively by a group of people who all wish to
participate as donors and decision-makers. This is because
that group of people requires an organizational structure
which regulates decision-making among the members and ensures
that the fund is managed directly by those in control for the
purposes intended. To accommodate these two requirements made
by the associated philanthropy, two legal forms are created:
the unincorporated association and the company limited by
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guarantee.
In contrast with the trust, these two forms are democratic in
the following characteristics : (i) a group of people
determines activities and provides funds; (ii) control of the
organization and its fund is vested in a board of directors
elected democratically from time to time; and (iii)
objectives stated in the constitution and the board policies
may change as membership changes. The last point appears to
suggest flexibility in changing purposes of the organization,
but the flexibility is limited by charity law. This legal
restriction both inhibits the trustees from manipulating the
organization and the use of funds and encourages charitable
giving. Neither forms expresses the use of the trust concept,
though by operation of law the property may be deemed to be
held in 'trust" for the corporation's purposes.
An unincorporated association is, in essence, a contract
between its members, whereby rules are formulated with regard
to its purposes, its management, the rights and liabilities.
It is suitable for impoverished charitable ventures because
only a straightforward constitution is needed for its
establishment. But there is a danger that the members are
liable for contracts made with due authority on the
association's behalf and for torts committed by an employee
of the association, The personal liability claimed in such
cases turns to the property the association owns and usually
it is not sufficient.
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Appendix B. Members of TNI and TLPI
The names of the individuals and their expertise provide
follows:
TNI
Private companies
Chris Sharp
(Chairman of TNI)
Nigel Sherlock
John Hall
John Ward
Graeme Anderson
Gavin Reed
Ron Scott
David Morris
Media
Tony Hill
Geraint Davies
Financier,
Managing director of Northern Rock Building
Company, tenth largest savings & loan
company in the U.K. Headquarter are located
in Newcastle.
Financier,
Director of Wise Speke, Financing company
Developer.
CEO of Cameron Hall Developments Ltd.,
having a strong leadership skill and
political influence as well
Banker,
Regional Director of Barclays Bank Plc.
Industrialist,
Previous Deputy CEO of Northern Engineering
Industries, employing a large number of
workers in the region
Industrialist,
CEO of Scottish & Newcastle Breweries, a
large Breweries in North England
Industrialist,
Executive of Storey Sons & Parker
Industrialist,
CEO of Northern Electric, electric power
supplier
Managing Director of Newcastle Chronicle &
Journal
Director of programmes of Tyne Tees &
Television
Chief Executive of Newcastle City Council
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Local Government
Geoff Cook
Quasi-county government agency
Alastair Balls Chief Executive of Tyne &Wear
Development Corporation (TWDC)
Quasi-private agency
John Bridge Chief Executive of Northern Development
Corporation (NDC)
Central Government agency.
Pamela Denham Regional Director of Department of Trade &
Industry, Director of City Action Team,
bringing together branches of the
Government departments such as Environment
and Transportation, Employment, and Trade
and Industry
Academia
John Goddard
Laing Barden
Chief Executive
Bill Hay
Professor
Director, Center of Real Estate Development
Studies, University of Newcastle
Professor
Director, Newcastle upon Tyne Polytechnic
of TNI
British Telecom
TLPI
Private companies
James F. Conway Industrialist
(Chairman) CEO, Courier Corporation
James L. Cooney Industrialist
(President) President, James L. Cooney Agencies
F. Larry Putnam Industrialist
(V.P.) CEO, Colonial Gas Company
Richard L. Alden Financier
Vice-President, Joan Fabrics Corporation
Paul Guzzi Industrialist
Vice-President, Wang Laboratories, Inc.
Richard K. Donahue Industrialist
President, NIKE Corporation
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Joseph R. Mullins Management
President, Joseph R. Mullins Company
Alan Rosen Owner
Norman's Mens Shop
Gilbert G. Campbell Developer
(V.P.) Campbell Real Estate
Edward Barry Developer
President, Congress Group Properties
Steve Joncas Developer
President, Belvedere Properties
Armand P. Mercier Developer
President, Mercier Realty
Gerald R. Wallance Financier
(Treasure) President / CEO, Lowell 5 Cent Savings
Bank
D. Eric Thompson Financier
(Secretary) President, Central Savings Bank
George L. Duncan Financier
CEO, Enterprise Bank & Trust
James L. Milinazzo
Patrick Sullivan
Media
Alex Costello
Hospital
M. Patricia Crane
Academia
Dr. Evan Dobelle
Dr. William Hogan
Financier
V.P., Lowell Institute for Savings
Financier
V.P., Shawmut Arligton Trust
Editor
Lowell Sun
Public affair
St. Joseph's Hospital
President, Middlessex Community
College
President, University of Lowell
Quasi-public Organization
Melvin A. Daly Chairman, Chamber of Commerce &
Industry
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T he Cijty
Richard P. Howe
James J. Campbell
Robert P. Malavich
Executive Director
James J. Cook
Mayor
City Manager
Director, Division of Planning &
Development
Ex-Director, Division of P&D
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Scenario for Conceptual Redevelopment
I present a scenario which the public-private partnership
organization that I propose might propose for Kawasaki.
Introduction
The focus of this scenario is on part of the waterfront zone
and industrial island in the south of Kawasaki,(MAP 1) The
area needs a fundamental changes to improve physical
conditions and social problems. It has been preventing
citizens from accessing from an inland residential and
commercial area around the center city to the water front.
I develop the idea of "Quasi-Experience City" to "Ecological
Quasi-Experience City' and apply this to an industrial area
in Kawasaki. The Quasi-experience City has following two
important attributes: more opportunities for activities in
urban settings and the efficient use of energy, which will
protect natural resources. The new urban life style will be
different from present patterns. The Quasi-experience City
internalizes out-of-city activities by providing quasi-
experiences which people have not yet encountered in cities.
The "Ecological Quasi-Experience City" provides more
opportunities and is more ecologically and socially sound.
Citizens in the city would be more conscious of the
importance of natural environment and willing to learn about
their city.
Overview of the focus area
The focus area is separat.ed from the residential and
commercial areas by an express highway running from Tokyo to
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Appendix C.
Yokohama. The Tsurumi River runs along the western edge of
the focus area. The focus area was formed by landfill between
1920 and 1970 and is primarily for industrial uses; housing
is located on the northern edge along railroad tracks. The
focus area includes a waterfront zone and an industrial
island. Separating the two is a half mile wide canal used by
ships bringing in industrial materials and leaving with
finished goods. The waterfront zone has several sub-canals
connected to the main canal and is occupied by power plants,
oil and gas storage tanks, sewage processing plants, petro-
chemical manufacturers, and steel-structure builders. The
industrial island is occupied by a steelmaking plant, and oil
storage tanks. The area is primarily for industrial use but
its north edge along a railroad is used for housing.
The standard of living of the focus area is as low as that of
other industrial cities in Japan. Housing is narrow, built
with cheap materials, and lacks privacy. Although basic
infrastructure such as water and sewage systems is well
equipped, the environment is not suitable for residential
uses. The level of pollution probably exceeds government
standards. The Tsurumi River, on the western edge of the
focus area, and the canals are contaminated by wastes from
houses and industries in and around the city. The air is also
contaminated from engineering industries. Most residents in
southern Kawasaki are below middle income. Because the area
does not have a better education system, the average
education level of residents is lower than that of other
major cities, and they are forced to work in mid-size or
small firms, which do not pay enough as well. The performance
of these mid-size or small businesses is always subject to
that of large manufacturing corporations. Needless to say,
they do not have enough time and money to spend on vacations.
But there are few recreational and cultural places in this
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area for them, The area lacks parks, sports facilities,
libraries, museums, theaters, and concert halls. The worst
aspect is inaccessibility to the waterfront because of the
industrial buildings. There are no open spaces, greenery, or
walkways in the focus area.
Japan is experiencing significant social changes, including
an aging population, which will affect the city in the
future. Kawasaki will have more elderly people than other
eastern cities, such as Tokyo, Yokohama, and Chiba. A
governmental committee has estimated that by 2000, 15.6% of
the population will be over sixty-five years old in Japan.
Southern Kawasaki will have an even higher rate than 15.6%
since it is already over 10%, which is 2% higher than the
average in Japan. Not only is this the result of natural
aging but the area has an old and industrial image. Since it
is not a desirable place to live, the young are leaving to
the suburban region of the northern Kawasaki, Yokohama, or
Tokyo. Even if the young live in Southern Kawasaki, they
choose to work in more attractive cities, such as Yokohama
and Tokyo, where there are higher incomes and more cultural
opportunities. Needless to say, this trend is the same in the
U.S.
Another important social change is the growing population of
foreigners. After World War II, the Japanese central
government limited the number of foreigners living in Japan
by imposing strict conditions on immigration permits. Until
recently, this policy has not been a problem since Japan was
a second-rate nation in terms of economic power, but today,
economically competitive, this policy is certainly outdated.
Since democratization occurred worldwide, Japan's limits on
immigration do not fit the direction of the world. Although
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the percentage of foreigners is still small and official
information on the current growth rate is not available,
there has been a significant increase in the number of
foreigners in Kawasaki and Chiba where rents are cheaper than
other eastern cities because of the worse living environments
in Kawasaki and Chiba. Attracted by Japan's strong economy
and cheaper rents, many Asian people are coming to Kawasaki
and Chiba. The majority who have legitimate rights to live in
Kawasaki, come from South and North Korea, China, and the
U.S. Other foreigners from Southeast Asia and the Middle
East, such as the Philippines and Turkey, only have work
visas, and live in Japan illegally for long period. Although
payments for their jobs are better than in their countries,
their working conditions are very bad simply because they are
not guaranteed the right to work. Some of them do not seem to
get jobs. Others get jobs yet they send much of the cash
earned to their families living in their own countries. They
cannot spend money for better living conditions; their living
stipends are below minimum.
This immigration is deteriorating the urban environment of
southern Kawasaki. Living conditions for illegal foreigners
are becoming worse; poverty and crime are increasing because
of their below-minimum living stipends and unemployment.
Worse, there are conflicts between immigrants and longtime
members of the community. Fortunately, but slowly, the
government is developing new policies for immigrant issues.
Scenario for evolution
1990-1995
The Tokyo Bay waterfront expressway will be completed by
1994. It was planned to connect three of the most vigorous
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economic cities, Chiba, Tokyo, and Yokohama. Around the same
time, Haneda International Airport, only several miles away
from the island, will have been enlarged to handle more
airplanes. By 1997, Tokyo Bay Crossing Bridge will have been
constructed and will make a circular express road connecting
Chiba, Tokyo, Kawasaki, and Yokohama.
These tremendous developments in transportation systems will
certainly fuel the Japanese economy; however, they will not
improve conditions in Kawasaki.They will affect the community
and local economy because improvements in transportation will
allow more people to move further out to ,other areas and
increase land prices due to the development potential
generated.
1995-2000
Heavy industries occupying the island will no longer need as
much building space and land.Some industries will even move
to other places and leave substantial amounts of vacant land.
My quasi-experience city would be planned in these areas.
Heavy engineering and steelmaking industries will face
declines in their price competitiveness and will be forced to
restructure and look to other industries and businesses, such
as "fine metals" (value added rare metals) and new material
making, biotechnology, computers, entertainment, and so-
called "silver businesses," which means medicare, nursing,
and day care for the elderly. These industries and businesses
need less space than land- and equipment- intensive
industries, which lead to the creation of vacant spaces in
industrial zones.
The decline of the land- and equipment- intensive industries
will cause unemployment. The declined economy will cause the
young generation to leave the city and leave an aging
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population. As a result, the elderly will increase at a
substantially higher rate than other cities.This will result
in a severe loss of confidence and sense of community of
citizens and industrialists. The value of land in this area
will plunge. But a wave of immigrants will occur because of
cheap land prices of land and properties and the proximity to
vigorous economic cities such as Tokyo and Yokohama, which
will promise employment. At the end of the twentieth century,
the central government will abandon its obsolete immigration
policy, which has limited the number of immigrants,
naturalized citizens, and permanent residents. This will
encourage more foreigners to immigrate in this area. The
needs foreigners for housing will create some confusion in
land use and deterioration of housing conditions. As a result
of these negative trends, the social order will be destroyed.
2000-2010
In Kawasaki, the voice to secure citizen's right for
equitable access to environmental resources will be louder
and louder from people living in the city. At the same time,
the number of corporations, which used to operate factories
in the waterfront zone and on then industrial island and
moved to an adjacent industrial area, willing to contribute
to social benefits will increase. Facing economic and social
problems, the local government, restructured industries, and
citizens will make a long term partnership for urban
redevelopment in Kawasaki. Industries will restructure
themselves in an attempt to improve the image of the city and
to attract capable employees. Citizens will be motivated to
improve housing and living conditions and local confidence.
The local government will need to raise revenue to meet the
needs of social welfare especially for the elderly. The
interests of these three groups will merge and the
development partnership will decide to plan'a quasi-
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experience city. The partnership identifies the island as a
potential urban resort zone with housing primarily for the
elderly. The partnership also expects domestic and
international tourists to visit the island city by using the
Haneda International Airport and improved vehicular
transportation.
In addition to this scenario, the following two significant
technologies will have been established by the year 2010: the
magnetic floating bullet train and hydrogen fueling car.
According to the report made by the Japanese Bureau of
Science and Technology in 1988, the magnetic floating train
will have been in use by 2001 and the hydrogen fueling car
will have been in wide use by 2010. These two technologies
ensure efficient long distance transportation and relief from
air pollution caused by cars using fossil fuel.
The partnership will advocate changing land use. First, it
will decide the heavy engineering industries no longer need
large tracts of land and they will move eastward, adjacent to
the waterfront zone and the island. In this area in which the
industries moved, all the industrial sites will be rearranged
so they can absorb the industries from the waterfront and
the industrial island. Industries which lose part of their,
original property, gain the right to participate in the
redevelopment of the vacant land.
By the end of the 2000's, the citizen's movement to seek
ecologically sound urban environments will occur and their
needs for information and knowledge about the eco-system in
the city will increase. This will lead the partnership to
envision a "Resort for Civic Intelligence' where citizens and
visitors learn about the city's history; ecological
engineering; optimal economic and social systems; and
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cultural studies and the arts.
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